July 11th, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
1 Comment
Partner and I cooperated on a neat defense on this hand from the club game of June 29.
(Sorry about the layout’s inconsistent designation of position name and vulnerability; West was dummy and NS only were vulnerable.)
West’s pass of 1NT seems odd to me, but this pair is not among the better at our club.
Partner led the ♠J, run to declarer’s ♠Q.
Declarer floated the ♥J, and I made the good, but fairly routine, play of ducking. A second heart was played by declarer and partner played the ten, covered by the Q and won by my now-stiff ♥K. Unsure of the pointed suit layout, I cashed the ♦K. Seeing a discouraging ♦2 from partner, I switched to spades, our side driving out declarer’s other spade stopper. Declarer now played a club toward the jack and I won the ♣K. After I have cashed out the spade suit, a club return by me would lead to down two. However I instead cashed the ♦A for our seventh trick – a play which you might think of as a panic play or you might think of as protecting our position, depending upon how likely you think the possibility that declarer failed to open 1NT on a hand with a balanced 15 count that includes the ♣Q.
Although I doubt his play mattered against the current competition, the play I really like was partner Len Aberbach’s play of the ♥T on the second round of hearts. Against a more skeptical/aware declarer, Len’s play of the ♥T on the second round of hearts was likely to reinforce the deception initiated by my – much easier – first round duck of the ♥K.
(Alas, +50 was average in our section and yet would have been a tie for top in the other section!)
June 25th, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
8 Comments
Playing in an event called a Bracketed Round Robin Swiss, my team was placed in Bracket 3. In this event, the eight lowest masterpoint teams play each other in the bottom bracket, the next lowest play each other in the second bottom bracket, etc. For the third highest bracket in a mid-sized regional, you can categorize most of the players as reliable, but their judgment (and, often, skills) are not likely to be as well-hewn as players in higher brackets. The opponents are not unlikely to offer you the occasional chance for a big score on a board, and you need to be prepared to take advantage if you are going to score enough Victory Points to win the bracket.
With that as contextual background, I faced an interesting strategic issue on one board.
All vul, I am first chair with ♠A98xxx, ♥Qx, ♦x, ♣QJxx. I might try a weak 2♠ opening under some circumstances, but vulnerable I choose to pass. LHO opens 1♥ and partner overcalls 2♣. RHO raises to 2♥. With good club support, I choose to call 2♠, hoping that a 4♠ game might fetch if we have a two-suited black suit fit. I am hoping that partner reads me for at least some club tolerance on this auction, taking inference about the length and/or quality of my spades from my failure to have opened with a preempt. LHO now calls 3♦, presumptively a game try in hearts. Partner doubles 3♦, and RHO offers 3♥. I bid 4♣ now, and two passes follow. Quite surprisingly, RHO doubles 4♣!
I strongly suspect that 4♣X is making, “giving” partner something better than x, xx, KJxx, AKxxxx.
Should I go for the big number by redoubling (the scoring, after all, is converted to Victory Points)?
I recall a similar situation from a KO a few years ago, where the competition was one of the leading pairs in our district. We were doubled in a contract that I was pretty sure was making. I passed and the contract did indeed make. But in the post mortem I rued my failure to have redoubled. Against those opponents, I suspect that personal ego, perhaps combined with disrespect for us as opponents, would have triumphed and they would have passed. Not only would making the redoubled contract have increased our IMP score against a team that was strongly favored over mine, but, knowing the opponents, I suspect that the blame-game that would have ensued might indirectly have produced additional good scores for my team. We did lose that KO, by the way.
But in the instant case, the strategic circumstances are different. In Bracket 3, the less confident opponents might choose to respect my judgment more than their own. Fearing a run to 4♥X where the return might not be as good as making 4♣X, I chose to pass. 4♣X became the final contract and when partner turned out to have just about the minimum hand I put him on, plus the ♥K, he scored up an overtrick for an unusual score of +910. We won 14 IMPs on this hand, but won the match by only 12 IMPs when a nonvulnerable game made at one table and defeated at the other more than canceled out small pluses for my team on a series of partials. This was the last match of the Round Robin, and, while winning Bracket 3 is no great bridge achievement, the win did allow us to capture first in the event that we entered, and that is better than not being first!
June 16th, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
1 Comment
Here’s a second illustration of the benefit of making the opponents have the last guess in the auction.
At favorable vulnerability, you hear your partner open 2♦, weak. RHO overcalls 3♣ and you hold ♠T2, ♥AKJ76, ♦J864, ♣72. What do you call?
I see two options: one option is to offer 3♥, getting partner off to your side’s probable best lead should LHO next introduce the spade suit; a second option is to preempt higher in diamonds, by bidding 4♦ (or even 5♦ if that is your wont). Each option has merit.
Let’s say that you choose the first option, to bid 3♥. The auction continues:
What do you now call?
Here is where, IMHO, enters the principle of making the opponents make the last guess. If you should bid 5♦ here, the next decision by the opponents will not be a guess. The opponents know quite a bit about the hand: West knows that East has clubs and has spade support; each opponent knows that your hand has heart values and diamond support. Your LHO can use that knowledge to judge well whether to compete further in spades (an attractive choice by West with, say, heart shortness and club length and some extra values … not to mention extra spade length or a diamond void), or to double your side in 5♦ (an attractive choice by West with, say, 2 to 3 hearts, limited club length and only moderate strength), or to pass the decision on to your RHO (an attractive choice by West when his hand is somewhere between).
At the table, South, chose to bid 5♦. West had an easy double.
Alas, the sacrifice was phantom: 4♠ was sure to lose the first four tricks in the red suits. Meanwhile 5♦X lost four top black suit cards and a trump for -500.
It is unclear still whether 3♥ was the best choice at South’s first turn. Unless West is a player who just can’t be shut out of the bidding (and they are quite a few of those at the local club … players who come not to defend but to declare), a jump to 4♦ at South’s first turn would have resulted in West’s passing … but if East, who has a singleton diamond, competed further with a takeout double, West might have then bid 4♠ or might have converted the double to penalty: who knows?
The motivation behind this entry, however, is to focus not on South’s first call, but rather on the parlay of South’s chosen calls: once South chose to bid 3♥ at his first turn, he should have passed at his next turn. The auction parlay chosen by South violated the principle of making the opponents have the last guess.
June 13th, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
No Comments
A totally unsolicited and – if any one cared – probably unappreciated post mortem on the auction of a hand reported by Bill Braucher of Billerica, MA from the recent D25 finals of the GNT championship flight. Spoiler alert – there is an inspired declarer play shown near the end of this post.
My comments:
- 1♥. No issue here.
- 1♠. I prefer 2♦, both establishing the game force and “bidding where I live”. Look at the choice this way: Would you rather partner held a stiff small spade or a stiff small diamond or Kxx of spades or Kxx of diamonds?
- 2♥. I agree with this choice, although the other table chose 3♥ at the same juncture.
- 4♥. Fine on the at-the-table auction, but over 1♥-2♦-2♥-4♣ would be a standout.
- 4♠. I do not care for this call at all: bad trump break is expected, as well as the inability to take many trump finesses. Other problems: bad trump intermediates and no expectation that the opponents have found more than an eight-card fit.
- 5♦. Take the money and double.
- Double. Why?
Without the double, 6♥ is easy on a club lead. Ruff a club, spade to the ace, ruff a second club, ♦ to king, having played ♥Q somewhere along the way. Winning six trumps in hand, two club ruffs in dummy, ♠A, and three top diamonds, losing a club only.
But here is the report of Bill Braucher:
“[South]’s double sounded like she had a void somewhere and [North] led a club. [Declarer] Alan [Watson of Lexington, MA] ruffed in dummy. Also fearing a void, he drew trumps and cashed ♠A and ♦K. Nope – no voids anywhere! What could [South] have? The only thing he could imagine was her actual shape. With the courage of his convictions, Alan led a diamond and finessed dummy’s nine for +1860!”
PS: To John Goold and our friends at Master Point Press: This is the first entry I have prepared using the updated blogging tools. Great job at creating Bridge Tools II!
June 2nd, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
1 Comment
2♦ is a toy. Everyone has his favorite toy: multi (weak two bid in an undisclosed major), Flannery (4 spades and 5 hearts, minimum strength opening, Mexican (18-19 point balanced hand), and many others.
Me? I prefer an old-fashioned weak two bid.
My preference was reinforced by my opponents using a weak two diamonds putting it to me at the Monday night matchpoint event (Board 10) of the recent Gopher regional in Minnesota.
Dealer: E, #10, 5/21 Vul: Both
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North ♠ K942 ♥ KQ652 ♦ 7 ♣ J43 |
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West ♠ JT865 ♥ 3 ♦ QJ84 ♣ A86 |
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East ♠ Q7 ♥ JT7 ♦ AKT953 ♣ 52 |
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South ♠ A3 ♥ A984 ♦ 62 ♣ KQT97 |
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West |
North |
East |
South |
— |
— |
2♦ |
P(?) |
4♦ |
All pass |
|
|
I was South. We were +100, a small reward when we were cold for eleven tricks in hearts. (A singleton heart lead by the hand with trump ace would scuttle 5♣.)
What should I bid over the 2♦ opening? A 3♣ call on a five card suit seems to be putting all of my eggs in one very small basket. As a fan of Marshall Miles, I am not particularly averse to making a four card overcall in one major on a good hand with a short holding in the other major, even at the two level, but even I require a better suit than A984. A double with only two card support in an unbid major did not seem attractive. Pass was my choice, but not a successful one.
Yes, the old-fashioned use for 2♦, a weak two, remains my favored use of the toy.
June 2nd, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
12 Comments
You hold ♠AQ96, ♥AQT75, ♦J7, ♣QJ. You open 1♥ and partner responds (a forcing) 1NT. What do you call?
I sympathize with the shown hand’s choice to avoid reversing to 2♠, but it is not my style to rebid a five card suit in this situation either. I would have chosen to bid 2♣. However, I am told that many players do not hold fast to my style and will rebid a good five card suit. Accordingly, the shown hand now chose to rebid 2♥.
How do you interpret your partner’s next call of 4♣? (I am the partner who bid 4♣.)
- Partner has clubs, really long clubs
- Partner has club shortness and support for hearts
- Partner has club strength and support for hearts
- Partner is nuts
Both my partner at the table and a couple of randomly chosen good players to whom I asked the question thought that my hand was showing support for hearts.
Really? If partner has a great hand in support for hearts, why is he not bidding 4♥? Can a 1NT responder have higher than game aspirations in hearts opposite a partner that opened 1♥ and rebid 2♥?
Only one of the players to whom I posed the question guessed correctly my actual hand. For my 4♣ call, I held, ahem, long clubs! Too weak to respond 2♣, too long/strong to respond with either a weak jump shift of 3♣ (we weren’t playing a 3♣ response as invitational) or to rebid 3♣ after the 2♥ response. My actual hand was ♠K5, ♥6, ♦T2, ♣KT876543. 4♣ makes (as would 5♣ if one of partner’s diamonds were a sixth heart), but we fought our way to 5♥, down six vulnerable tricks!
June 2nd, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
5 Comments
I faced an uncomfortable position defending a contract against a pair not known to me at a pairs event at the recent Gopher Regional in Minnesota.
The auction engaged by the opponents was1♦-1♥-1♠-2♥-3♦-3NT.
Partner led the ♣6 and I viewed dummy.
|
East ♠ AJT5 ♥ T ♦ AKQT96 ♣ J5 |
South ♠ 873 ♥ QJ95 ♦ J2 ♣ AKT9 |
|
West |
North |
East |
South |
— |
— |
1♦ |
P |
1♥ |
P |
1♠ |
P |
2♥ |
P |
3♦ |
P |
3NT |
All pass |
|
|
What is your defensive plan?
I am pretty confident that declarer owns the ♣Q. I think the general plan is to sever communications between the two hands, to eventually lock the declaring side in dummy with the hope that our side can win some late spade tricks.
So thinking, I won the ♣K and played the ♥Q. The ♥Q held the trick, both declarer and partner following suit small.
I don’t think declarer would duck with the ♥AK, so I think partner now has a stiff honor. After severing communications in clubs by cashing the ♣A, I must decide whether partner remains with the ♥A or the ♥K.
- If partner has the ♥A, a heart return is the move to make. Lead a heart to his ace and, expecting partner to buy into the dummy lock defense, await a diamond return. Partner will take some number of spade tricks in the end.
- If partner has the ♥K, a heart return is the move to avoid. A heart return would allow declarer to cash both the ♥A and the ♣Q before leading a diamond to dummy.
I guessed the latter, thinking that declarer might have covered the ♥Q if she held only the ♥K and not the ♥A.
But making the guess that partner holds the bare ♥K creates a problem with respect to what to next lead. If partner holds the ♦8(!), exiting with the ♦J is the route to lock dummy. But if declarer holds the ♦8, then the ♦8 (if not singleton) will be an entry to declarer’s hand to cash the now-good ♣Q. If that is the case I should now lead a spade, playing partner for KQxxx of spades. Declarer can win the ♠A in dummy and run the diamonds, but partner must win at least one more spade trick in the end, as declarer’s good ♥A and ♣Q are stranded.
That’s the defensive play I went for: ♥Q winning, ♣A winning, spade … but …
Dealer: E, #6, 5/21 Vul: EW
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North ♠ K9642 ♥ A7 ♦ 754 ♣ 632 |
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West ♠ Q ♥ K86432 ♦ 83 ♣ Q874 |
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East ♠ AJT5 ♥ T ♦ AKQT96 ♣ J5 |
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South ♠ 873 ♥ QJ95 ♦ J2 ♣ AKT9 |
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Not a success!
June 2nd, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
1 Comment
Recent experiences cause me to wonder if the raise of opener’s rebid minor to the three level is one of the more underutilized bridge bids.
Example 1 was the product of a question from another player (AP), regretting a game swing loss from a prior day match.
- AP: What would I rebid with ♠AKx, ♥x, ♦xxx, ♣AKJxxx after opening 1♣ and hearing a 1♥ response?
- I: 2♣ would be my choice, with some sympathies for 1♠ and 3♣.
- AP: That’s what I bid, but my counterpart at the other table chose 3♣ and their side got to a good 3NT.
- I: That’s too bad, I sympathized, and then thought to ask what was his partner’s hand.
- AP: He had Qxx of clubs and a ten count.
- I: Shouldn’t he have rebid 3♣?
Example 2 was from a regional pairs event. Partner held ♠AQ6, ♥KJT84, ♦943, ♣85. I opened 1♦ and partner responded 1♥. I rebid 2♦. Partner, concerned about missing a 5-3 heart fit, chose to rebid 2♠. I bid 2NT on ♠KT3, ♥7, ♦KQJT65, ♣K74. Partner passed 2NT. I lost four clubs and two red aces for -50 when 3♦ would have made an overtrick (clubs were QJ963 to my left and AT2 to my right).
First, I think the concern about missing a 5-3 heart fit was overblown. Had my major suits been reversed, I would have raised to 2♥. Second, I think the 2♠ rebid created a game force. Third, partner’s hand seems like a 3♦ rebid to me. On the instant hand, I would pass 3♦. But on a slightly stronger hand – say one where my diamond suit was AKJ-sixth instead of KQJ-sixth, I might have chosen the same auction through 2♦ but then would have chosen to bid 3NT over the 3♦ raise.
Example 3 is similar to Example 1 but from another blogger’s website. There, West held ♠A, ♥96, ♦AQT654, ♣A654. The blogger’s teammate earned a game swing when he chose to rebid 3♦ over his partner’s 1♠ response. His partner next bid 3NT, making easily opposite ♠KT85, ♥K82, ♦J93, ♣K32 when the ♦K was in the slot. At the blogger’s table, West chose to rebid only 2♦ and game was missed.
But is the cause of the missed game West’s rebid choice, or East’s failure to have raised his partner’s 2♦ rebid to 3♦?
Notice that had West held a slightly weaker hand, say one where the ♠A morphed into a small spade, a 3♦ second round bid by East would not have led to 3NT but might have shut out a paying heart partial reached through a balancing call.
In all three examples, I think responder should have raised opener’s 2m rebid (a wide-ranging call) to three. (The raise is often appropriate on a two-card holding in the minor, too, when holding invitational values.) Perhaps that raise is one of the more underutilized bids in bridge.
May 20th, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
1 Comment
Playing 2/1, with a series of follow up treatments that include serious 3NT, and picture bids and other stuff that your partner believes are “expert standard”, you hold this hand at Friday’s club dup: ♠KQ75 ♥T2 ♦T ♣AK9842. Partner opens 1♠ in second chair and third hand passes.
Do you splinter, bid Jacoby 2NT, or respond a game forcing 2♣?
I like partner Len Aberbach’s choice of 2♣. He next heard me rebid 2♥.
Both 2♠ and 3♠ at this point shows real support (at least three card support). 3♠ shows at least a king more than a minimum. Which would you choose?
I might have chosen 3♠ at the table, but Len’s choice of 2♠ worked well.
When we have achieved major suit agreement at the two level in a 2/1 auction, opener’s third bid shows his shape. Hence, my 2NT bid showed 5=4=2=2.
Len now found a descriptive call of 4♦. Although we have not discussed this particular bid, my past partnership experience leads me to conclude that this bid shows shortness in diamonds. My hand being ♠AJ982 ♥A986 ♦J5 ♣QT, I control bid 4♥, which is “on the house”, being lower than 4♠. Next Len bids 4NT (keycard) and I respond 5♥ (two of 5 keycards, no ♠Q). That’s enough for Len to bid 6♠.
West ♠ KQ75 ♥ T2 ♦ T ♣ AK9842 |
|
East ♠ AJ982 ♥ A986 ♦ J5 ♣ QT |
West |
North |
East |
South |
— |
P |
1♠ |
P |
2♣ |
P |
2♥ |
P |
2♠ |
P |
2NT* |
P |
4♦* |
P |
4♥ |
P |
4NT* |
P |
5♥* |
P |
6♠ |
All pass |
|
|
Nothing splits horribly and we are +980 for 15.5 out of 16 matchpoints. Nicely bid by partner. And I am hoping that the agreements I foisted upon him might have contributed a bit.
May 20th, 2012 ~ Jeff Lehman ~
4 Comments
I received a filthy matchpoint score on Board 22 of Friday’s club duplicate. Was the bad result deserved or unlucky?
Partner and I are playing weak (12-14) notrumps. With the opponents silent, pard opens 1♦ in third chair, I respond 1♠, and partner rebids 1NT, showing 15-17.
What is your rebid with ♠AT762 ♥J53 ♦7653 ♣T? Your agreements are such that you cannot, unfortunately, sign off in 2♦, although you can sign off in 3♦.
Focusing heavily on partner’s choice of minor suit opening, I feared the club suit in a notrump contract. Accordingly, I chose to rebid my five card suit, bidding 2♠. That ended the bidding.
The ♦9 was led by one member of the middling opponents, not among either the best or worst pairs in the room.
West ♠ 85 ♥ AQ76 ♦ AKJT ♣ J97 |
|
East ♠ AT762 ♥ J53 ♦ 7653 ♣ T |
Well, I am thankful I did not pass 1NT as the clubs are wide-open, but then I did not draw well when it comes to trump support. Maybe 3♦ would have been a better choice.
Can’t worry about that now. I am in the normal contract, although from an abnormal side as I expect that at most tables partner’s hand will open 15-17 1NT, my hand will transfer to spades, and the same contract will be played from the opposite side. I am not too troubled by the siding of the contract, since only a diamond lead from Q-third by North probably gives up a trick.
Speaking of diamonds, that suit was led and was the suit of the opening bid of my partner. Would you put South on a stiff diamond?
I did, winning the ♦K in dummy but choosing nonetheless to lead a spade from dummy and to duck when seeing North’s ♠J, South following small. North then played the ♣2 to his partner’s ♣Q. South continued the ♣A and I chose to ruff.
Next I played the ♠A, seeing the Q from North and a second small spade from South.
Now what?
I don’t know if there is much to this, but I chose to guess that South was 4=3=1=5 and North 2=3=4=4. I abandoned trumps and took a heart finesse, the queen losing to North’s ♥K. North continued a third round of clubs, the king, and I ruffed again as South followed suit. I next played the ♥J and ♥A, everyone following suit. I played the thirteener heart next as North discarded a club, I a diamond, and South ruffed with the ♠9 for the fourth trick of the defense (1 club, 1 heart, 1 high spade, and now a heart ruff).
South now played ♦4. Uh-oh, now looks like South was 3=3=2=5 and North 3=3=3=4. Eventually I lost a diamond and the high outstanding trump for down one -100.
Dealer: East, #22 Vul: EW
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North ♠ KQJ ♥ K98 ♦ Q82 ♣ K832 |
|
West ♠ 85 ♥ AQ76 ♦ AKJT ♣ J97 |
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East ♠ AT762 ♥ J53 ♦ 7653 ♣ T |
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South ♠ 943 ♥ T42 ♦ 94 ♣ AQ654 |
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The board was played 17 times. 2♠ was the contract 14 times, two of them by East, the rest by West. One West played 2♦ and two Souths declared 3♣. The other East who played 2♠ went down one trick also, as did two of the Wests who played 2♠. Every other EW pair, however, beat our -100 meaning that we scored 1.5 out of 16 available matchpoints.
Did I misplay? Or is the result that other players played for trumps to be 3-3 and thus made their contracts? I think that had South owned a stiff ♦9 and K943 of spades, playing for spades to be 3-3 would result in down three and -300, as the defense can draw my spades and then run a bunch more clubs. I looked at the results, hoping to see that the other declarers who went down one trick were among the better players at the club; but the group of unsuccessful declarers was not distinctive. So, my excuse of being unlucky is pretty tentative, waiting to see if others have some insight that I missed at the table.