Jeff Lehman

Avoiding partnership misunderstandings from conventions

In reading about bridge results in The Bridge World and other publications, I admire the experts’ use of various conventions to hone their bidding judgments.  Although I could see the merits of two particular conventions – good/bad 2NT and kickback – I was reluctant to propose to adopt them in my partnerships.  My reluctance was caused by fear that partners would use the conventions in circumstances in which I did not think the convention would apply and vice versa.  Better, I thought, to not adopt the conventions than to suffer bad results from one of us misapplying the conventions.

I still subscribe to the underlying tenet suggested by the above reluctance – that it is winning strategy to fail to adopt a convention for which you and partner might have differing interpretations.

However, with respect to good/bad 2NT and kickback, I think a few simple rules of application can allow a partnership to obtain most of the potential benefits of the conventions without running substantial risk of suffering a partnership misunderstanding.  Although I am sure that expert pairs can adopt more sophisticated rules for fully benefiting from use of these conventions, my partnerships will get by just fine by adopting some pretty easy rules of application, thank you.

Before detailing the simple rules I have proposed for using these conventions, allow me to discuss the general purpose of each of the two conventions.

Good/bad 2NT is designed to allow a partnership to compete with a distributional hand and also inform  partner whether such competition is from a weak, distributional hand or a stronger, distributional hand.  For example, assume you open 1 on xx, xx, AQJxxx, Axx.  LHO passes, partner responds 1, and RHO overcalls 2.  You want to compete to 3, but you fear that partner might read a 3call as suggesting a stronger hand, say one where one of the small spades is the A.  Thinking that your 3 call shows such a hand, partner might rebid 3NT on a hand such as KQxxx, Kxx, xx, Jxx.  What good/bad 2NT accomplishes is to allow you to bid 3 on each hand.  You just bid 3directly with one such hand (most play the direct call shows the stronger hand) and you bid 3indirectly with the other hand (by beginning with a good/bad 2NT call and then, over partner’s 3 puppet, bidding 3; most play the indirect call to show the weaker hand, sort of lebensohl-like).  You would also use the good/bad 2NT call to distinguish between distributional hands of differing strength that contain a good second suit such as xx, x, AQJxx, KQTxx and Ax, x, AQJxx, KQTxx.

Kickback is designed to allow a partnership to have more room for follow up responses to keycard auctions.  When spades is trump, 4NT keycard works best.  Should partner respond the second step of 5, asker can bid 5 to ask about the trump queen and not be beyond safety level of 5 of agreed major.  But what happens when the second step response to 4NT keycard is 5 and hearts is the agreed trump suit?  Then 5 is needed as a signoff call and is not available to ask about the trump queen.  How kickback helps this situation is by redefining the keycard ask call, depending upon what suit is agreed as trumps.  When spades is trumps, 4NT remains the keycard ask.  But when any other suit is trump, the keycard ask becomes 4 of the suit immediately above the trump suit (so, 4 is the key card ask when hearts are trump).  Easy enough one would think, but the scope for partnership misunderstanding is great.  When the partnership has shown and supported hearts and is engaging in a control bid auction, how can the partners tell that a 4 call is kickback asking for key cards or just another control bid or even an attempt at signing off?

Here are the simple rules I have proposed in my partnerships:

  • Good/bad 2NT
    • Conditions of application
      • By opening bidder only
      • Requires:
        • opening 1 bid
        • suit or notrump response at 1 level or negative double of 1 level overcall by responder
        • bid at 2 level by RHO
      • Meaning of opener’s bids
        • Direct bid at three level shows extra values
        • Bid of 2NT is relay to 3C, with follow up call by opener being natural and weaker than a direct bid at three level.
          • Exception: if opening bid were 1D and responder’s diamonds are better than his clubs, responder should relay to 3D rather than to 3C
          • (optional) Exception: in specific auction 1m-(1S)-dbl-(2S):
            • 2NT is good/bad 2NT, but without heart support
            • double is a hand that would have raised 1H to 2H in an uninterfered auction
            • 3H is a hand that would have raised 1H to 3H in an uninterfered auction

    • Identifying call which is key card ask (“kickback”)
      • When spades is agreed suit, 4NT is key card ask
      • When suit other than spades is agreed suit
        • Key card ask suit is 4 of suit ranking directly above agreed suit
        • Exceptions when 4 of suit ranking directly above agreed suit is:
          • a suit that was bid by either partner on first round of auction; or
          • a single jump that can be a splinter bid
        • When an exception applies to eliminate as key card ask suit 4 of suit ranking directly above agreed suit, then key card ask suit is 4 of suit ranking two suits above agreed suit, etc.
      • When key card ask suit is other than 4NT, then 4NT becomes a control bid in suit of keycard ask.  Similarly, a call of 5NT substitutes in meaning for 6 of the key card ask suit.

Below represents correction of May 7, 2011

    • Identifying call which is key card ask (“kickback”)
      • Precondition is that in subject auction, 4NT would, absent kickback agreement, be keycard and not quantitative, choice-of-suit, etc.
      • When spades is agreed suit, 4NT is key card ask
      • When suit other than spades is agreed suit
        • Key card ask suit is 4 of suit ranking directly above agreed suit
        • Exception when 4 of suit ranking directly above agreed suit is a suit that was bid by either partner on first round of auction
        • When exception applies to eliminate as key card ask suit 4 of suit ranking directly above agreed suit, then key card ask suit is 4 of suit ranking two suits above agreed suit, etc.
      • When key card ask suit is other than 4NT, then 4NT and the 4-level key card ask swap meanings.  Similarly, calls of 5NT and the 5-level key card ask swap meanings.

Matchpoint hands from Cape Cod regional

Try your hand from some matchpoint problems from a recent regional.

Wed eve, board 26.

1NT-3NT auction.

West

AK3

JT87

JT2

J65

East

T87

AK3

Q643

AK2

The 2 lead was won by dummy’s J.  The J was led and held.  The T was captured by North’s ace.  North returned a heart, won perforce in my hand.  I played a spade to dummy in order to lead a third round of diamonds.  Oops, North showed out, pitching a spade, and South won this diamond and the next as I shed a heart from dummy and North pitched a club.  A heart was played next by South and North pitched a spade as I won with my remaining high heart honor.  At this point I had won five of the first eight tricks (three hearts, one spade, and one diamond) and had lost three diamonds.  I had three top tricks remaining in the black suits but needed one more winner.  I played the other top spade and then a third spade.  North won but then he had to lead from Q and when I let that ride to dummy’s jack, I could claim nine tricks.

Dealer:

Vul:

North

Q9652

54

A8

Q943

West

AK3

JT87

JT2

J65

East

T87

AK3

Q643

AK2

South

J4

Q962

K975

T87

No, I don’t know if I would have gone right had North come down to the doubleton Q and three spades for his last five cards.  Probably I should drop the Q then because South’s play of the J on second round of that suit should clue me in to North’s distribution.

Wed eve., board 29.

After an auction to your own to 3NT, of 1-2-3-3-3NT, how do you play as East upon lead of 2?

West

K96

AKT7

2

QJT32

East

J743

9

AKT6

A987

The defense has not found the best lead; a diamond lead would have been more challenging and even a heart presents more difficulty.  Can you take advantage?

To try to take advantage of the tempo presented by the lead, I rose with the K at Trick 1.  When North followed suit with T, the hand seemed pretty easy to diagnose.  I took the club finesse successfully and ended in hand when North was dealt Kx.  Next I led a spade to South’s five and dummy’s six, essentially finessing against South’s 8.  As expected, North won the Q from his dealt holding of QT tight.  North then returned a diamond but it was too late.  I won the K and forced out the A, winning eleven tricks (five clubs, two spades, and two sets of red AK’s) for a top board.

Th afternoon, board 1.

For the first sixteen boards of this session, I was dummy on eight and defender on eight.  I finally get a chance to declare on this, the seventeenth board.  Alas, I claim twelve tricks at Trick 1 and have yet to declare a card that matters.  Nice 4 call by partner, Wayne Burt of Pembroke, NH, eh?

Dealer: North

Vul: none

North

A5

AJ765

Q

AQ952

South

8742

KQ983

KJ73

West North East South
1 3 4
5 6 All pass

Th afternoon, board 2.

As North, what do you lead against opponents’ auction of 3-3NT?

Dealer: East

Vul: NS

North

A962

K52

Q9643

J

West

Q54

A64

AJ87

A62

East

J87

J73

KQT9543

South

KT3

QT98

KT52

87

I led a spade and when partner made the not unreasonable continuation of a spade, we had given away a tenth trick.

Th afternoon, board 3.

As North, what action do you take after partner opens 2and West passes, fav vul?

North

76

K87

KT82

9863

The conditions are ripe for creating a smokescreen: I bid 2NT (Ogust in this partnership).  Partner responded 3, good hand, good suit and so I bid 4.  With points of opponents nearly equally divided, neither made a call and -150 was a great score, with eleven tricks available to EW in a spade contract.

Dealer:

Vul:

North

76

K87

KT82

9863

West

AT543

JT

Q63

AJ2

East

QJ98

32

AJ95

KQ4

South

K2

AQ9654

74

T75

Th eve, board 4.

What is your signaling plan as West after partner – old Golden Arm – leads the K (you lead A from AK and length) against 1-4 auction?

West

94

KQJ2

A93

T973

South

QJ762

7

T762

J85

Attitude will soon be known by all, as soon as declarer wins the ace on this trick.  Ergo, your first signal should be count signal.  When declarer later leads a club toward dummy’s jack, you should signal suit preference for diamonds.  The heart suit can wait because a pitch of a heart on the J can hardly cost, but a pitch of a diamond might.

Th, eve, board 5.

Against fourth chair 1– (conservative) 1NT, what is your lead as South?

South

QJ62

KJ953

6

JT5

My opponent led a spade.  I don’t know if there is anything to his decision, but it worked well for him.  A heart would have given me an extra trick, but the spade just gave me discarding problems.

Dealer: North

Vul: NS

North

AK97

86

Q952

742

West

T8

Q72

AT874

AQ6

East

543

AT4

KJ3

K983

South

QJ62

KJ953

6

JT5

Th eve, board 12.

What is your call as East after partner opens 1 and North doubles, at fav vul?

East

65

K2

J98654

K87

I bid 2.

Dealer: West

Vul: NS

North

AQJ984

A83

AT73

West

2

Q97

KQ

AT96532

East

65

K2

J98654

K87

South

KT73

JT654

2

QJ4

South could no longer cue bid 2 (for which one possible meaning is invitational values with both majors) and wasn’t sure what double would mean in his partnership.  Ergo, he bid 2.  Now my partner, Wayne Burt, made a nice pressure call to raise to 5, presenting North with a problem.  North decided to double and -300 was a nice result in exchange for the slam their direction.

Th eve, board 14.

As East, you lead the K against 3.  How do you continue?

East

54

T98

AKT2

AQ76

South

KT86

732

Q74

K95

West North East South
1 P
1 1! Dbl (support) 2
P P 3! 3!
All pass

At the table, I played A, then small club.  Partner, bless him, held the J and the defense had set up a third round club winner before the Q could be established for a pitch.

Dealer: East

Vul: none

North

AQJ7

AJ4

J83

T32

West

932

KQ65

965

J84

East

54

T98

AKT2

AQ76

South

KT86

732

Q74

K95

No big deal on this hand because declarer’s distribution was flat.  Maybe next time declarer will be 5=3=2=3.

Th eve, board 15.

West North East South
P
P 1 P 2 (4-card Drury)
P 2(subminimum) P 4!

Yes, that was the actual auction of the opponents.  Can you make use of the information given by North and volunteered by South’s auction choice?  What is your lead?

East

J4

KQ743

Q63

KQ6

Better choose the K and not the K.  I erred by choosing clubs and that made a two trick difference, converting +100 into -650.

Dealer:

Vul:

North

AQ653

T2

84

A842

West

82

J965

KJT7

975

East

J4

KQ743

Q63

KQ5

South

KT97

A8

A952

JT3

Best play, or just most special play?

Not sure I made the best choice on declarer play of this hand from just concluded KO, but the situation was interesting.

I opened the South hand with a 15-17 1NT and West overcalled 2, alerted and described as clubs and a major, expected to be 5-5.  Partner doubled, in this partnership the double being defined as Stayman.  I bid 2 and partner made an aggressive raise to 4.

North

Kx

Axxx

xxxx

Qxx

South

QJxx

KQJx

AKT

Jx

West North East South
1NT
2 Dbl P 2
P 4 All pass

West began with two top clubs and then played a third.  What do you pitch on the Q?

Let’s assume that West is 5-5 in the black suits.  If he is 5=2=1=5, then the best pitch is a diamond.  After trumps are drawn, it will be easy to ruff the fourth spade in dummy and lose only the first two club tricks and the A.  But if West is 5=1=2=5, meaning trumps are 4-1, declarer will either have a spade winner ruffed or lose the fourth round of spades and the contract will fail.  Might it be better to pitch the fourth round of spades on the Q?  If both missing diamond honors are onside, the T dealt you by Brigidda, the goddess of bridge, will produce an extra trick.  Of course, you might lose a finesse to Q or J, perhaps, in your nightmare, to a stiff diamond on a hand where trumps split 3-2 and straightforward pitch of a spade will work.

I hope I was not motivated by a Lust for the Special, but I decided to pitch a spade on the third club.  Well, nothing mattered: West was 5=2=1=5, and East owned both diamond honors.  Not sure if there was similar interference at the other table, but the board was pushed at 4 making.

As an aside, I note that the cooperative double idea of Phillip Martin, the focus of an earlier blog of mine, would have worked well on this hand.  2 overcall would presumptively have been passed around to me (this is assuming that partner would evaluate his hand as invitational strength only, which seems about right to me).  With a doubleton club, I would double.  Partner would know that opponents have an eight card club fit and would bid on by calling either 2 or cue bidding 3, depending upon how he chooses to value the Q.  At any rate, he would know that my hand, which has shown a doubleton club, has at least an eight card fit with his hand unless I am specifically 5=3=3=2.  Meanwhile, we would have gained the ability to punish/double the opponents should, for example, partner’s rounded suits had been switched.

A little bit of this, a little bit of that …

“Defended” our team’s runner up finish in top bracket KO at Cape Senior Regional this year.  We played solidly through the series of three-ways leading to the semifinals, winning all four of our matches, including one against the team of all Grand Life Masters (including a recently crowned World Champion) that would defeat us in the finals.  Did not play so well in semifinal but opponents had problems as well and so we did make it to finals, where, unfortunately, we did not play as well as last year, nor, frankly, even well by a general standard.

In one of the three-ways I declared an interesting hand that merits the title of this blog post.

North

Q96xxx

AQJx

xx

x

South

A8

9x

Txxxx

AKxx

West North East South
1
P 1 P 2
P 2 All pass

I was favored with a heart lead from East into my tenace, topping the ten with the Q.  Next I played two rounds of clubs to pitch one of my losing diamonds.  I ruffed a club.  I played a spade to the ace, seeing an ominous ten from West.  I played dummy’s fourth club, pitching a diamond when West followed suit to the club.  East pitched a diamond.  West tried cashing a diamond but I could now ruff the diamond as East played the Q.  I now played the A and ruffed a heart with dummy’s last trump.  I have won eight of first nine tricks and no matter what happens, East will have to ruff in at some time and give me my Q for a ninth trick and +140.  The whole hand was:

Dealer:

Vul:

North

Q96xxx

AQJx

xx

x

West

T

Txx

AKJx

QTxxx

East

K7xx

Kxxx

Qx

Jxx

South

A8

9x

Txxxx

AKxx

Why the title of this blog?  All of the following techniques applied to the declarer play:

  • Pitching a loser on a winner (the small diamond on the second club winner)
  • Trump elopement (ruffing both a small club and a small diamond in the long trump hand)
  • Loser-on-loser (pitching the second small diamond on the fourth round of clubs, thus converting a dangerous club ruff into a safe diamond ruff)
  • Trump endplay (forcing long trump East on play in order to score up my poorly placed Q).

Just like the song from Fiddler on the Roof: a little bit of this, a little bit of that …

Cooperative doubles after 1NT openings ala Phillip Martin

One of my favorite bridge conventions is cooperative doubles after we open 1NT and the opponents intervene.  The convention is explained by Phillip Martin at http://sites.google.com/site/psmartinsite/Home/bridge-articles/countering-notrump-interference.

To show the richness of the convention, I am going to present an illustration.  Just as the convention is a steal from Phillip Martin’s website, the illustrated hand is a steal from BridgeWinners website.  There, Kit Woolsey was presenting another of his fascinating “over the shoulder” analyses of a hand he played in the Rosenblum Cup.  I have slightly modified the hand presented by Woolsey to make the opening bid of 1NT consistent with the 12-14 range adopted by most of my partnerships, rather than the 10-12 range used by Woolsey and his partner on the hand.  If you should use 15-17 as the range for your 1NT opening, feel free to further modify the hand.  The actual ranges you use do not matter: if your range for opening 1NT is 3 HCP higher than my range, then your range for responder’s cooperative double will be 3 HCP lower than my range.  What is important is not the relevant ranges but the distributional inferences that can permit the opening side to compete effectively when their 1NT opening is met with interference.

Before presenting the illustrated hand to describe how the cooperative doubles apply, allow me to first state that a partnership has many choices how to define a double of an overcall of their 1NT opening.  Many partnerships use a double as penalty and many other partnerships use a double as takeout.  I can’t definitively say that their use of the double is worse than my using the double as cooperative.  All I can say is that I prefer the cooperative double use.

The primary purpose of the cooperative double is to penalize the opponents when they have interfered with our 1NT opening and our side has: (1) the balance of power, meaning usually 22-25 HCPs; and (2) sufficient length in the trump suit of the opponents — sort of a Total Tricks concept, but on defense –, meaning six or more combined trumps if the opponents are in a two-level contract or five or more combined trumps if the opponents are in a three-level suit contract.  Failing the second of those two conditions, meaning we have the balance of power but insufficient combined length in the trump suit of the opponents, we seek the secondary purpose of the cooperative double, to compete effectively for a partial.

OK.  Enough talk; let’s show some cards:

Dealer:

Vul: West

North

AK54

AT865

4

QJ4

West

98

Q3

AK73

KT985

East

Q762

K42

QT52

A6

South

JT3

J97

J986

732

West opens 1NT, showing 12-14.  North overcalls 2, in the instant case showing the major suits.

East has the prototypical hand for the cooperative double: 10-11 HCP, doubleton in the suit of the overcall, at least three card support for each suit other than the suit of the overcall.  One of the interesting aspects of the convention is that the meaning of East’s double is not altered by the meaning of North’s 2 overcall.  Whether 2 shows the majors (as here), or clubs, or a two-suiter with or without clubs, or a one-suiter not necessarily clubs … that does not matter.  In all of those cases the cooperative double by East shows a doubleton in the suit overcalled.  (A few other hand types of East also call for a cooperative double, as discussed in Martin’s article, but here I will focus on the prototype shown here and leave the discussion of the other types and the follow ups to those other types to Martin’s article.)

What East is hoping will happen is that the strength and distributional information provided by East’s cooperative double will enable the partnership to penalize the opponents.

Let’s see what might happen next.

Let’s first assume that South bids 2, asking, per the N-S agreements, for his partner to bid his better major.

West will double 2.  Knowing — because of East’s cooperative double of 2 — both that his partnership has the balance of power, and that East has at least three diamonds, West can make a penalty double of 2.  If, on the other hand, West had only a doubleton diamond (which means that the combined diamond length of EW could be as few as five), he would pass 2.

North runs to 2.  If East had four hearts, East would double 2 for penalty.  Combined with the minimum of two hearts expected of West for his 1NT opening bid, East would know that the EW partnership has at least six combined trumps, enough to penalize a 2 contract.  However, in this case East was dealt only three hearts, the minimum number he promised when he made his cooperative double on the previous round.  Hence, East must pass 2and hope that West has at least three hearts and can make a penalty double.

Alas, when 2 is passed around to West, West can see that the opponents have found a successful escape.  West has only two hearts and his partner has only three hearts; not enough combined heart length to double the opponents.  Given that EW still has the balance of power on the hand, however, West can hardly afford to pass out 2.  Instead he must compete for the partial.

How might West compete for the partial?  Well, if West owned four spades, he would bid 2.  East has promised at least three spades, maybe more, from East’s first round cooperative double of 2 and so 2 should have play.  However, in the instant case, West has only two spades and so a 2 call is out of the question.  What does West know about East’s distribution?  He knows that East has a doubleton club (from the initial cooperative double of 2 made by East).  He also knows that East has exactly three hearts (three or more hearts were promised by the cooperative double, and East has denied as many as four hearts by having failed to make a penalty double of 2).  Hence, West knows that East has eight cards in the pointed suits.  These eight pointed suit cards might be divided 4-4 or 5-3 either direction.

If West’s distribution were 2=2=5=4, West could safely bid 3 here.  He would know that East has at least three diamonds and so the fit for a 3 contract should be acceptable.  However, West’s actual distribution is not 2=2=5=4 but is 2=2=4=5.  Now a 3 call risks landing the partnership in a seven card fit at the three level; that would surely not be acceptable.  Accordingly, West’s actual call in passout seat is 2NT, a scramble call.

To summarize the auction to date:

West North East South
1NT (12-14) 2(showing majors) Dbl (10-11 HCP, doubleton club, at least three cards in each other suit) 2(asks for better major)
Dbl (3+ diamonds) 2 (better major) Pass (denying 4+ hearts) P
2NT (scramble)

Now let’s move to East’s seat and explore the distributional inferences East has available about West’s hand.  First, East knows that West has at least three diamonds (because West made a penalty double of South’s 2 call).  Second, East knows that West has exactly two hearts (because West failed to make a penalty double of 2).  Third, East knows that West has fewer than four spades (because West failed to balance with 2 call).  Fourth, East knows that West has fewer than five diamonds (because West failed to balance with a 3 call).  The possible distributions for West are 3=2=3=5 or 3=2=4=4 or the actual 2=2=4=5.  To avoid the risk of playing 3 on the first of the three possible distributions, where the partnership has only seven combined diamonds, East will pass West’s 2NT call.

And, lo and behold, 2NT is probably the best place for EW.  Even if, on a different allocation of the high cards, NS could run the first five heart tricks against 2NT, chances are strong that EW can claim the final eight tricks.

Let’s go back to an earlier stage in the auction.  Let’s assume that instead of bidding 2 at his first turn to ask for North’s better major, South had passed 2X.  Of course, West would pass 2X, too.  But North would rescue his partnership by calling 2.  East would pass 2.  As before, the parlay of East’s first round cooperative double of 2 and his second round pass of 2 would show exactly three hearts.  As in the actual auction, West would balance with 2NT.  And again, East has available to him enough distributional inferences about West’s hand to pass 2NT.

Cooperative doubles after the opponents have interfered with our opening 1NT are not bullet-proof.  The emphasis by the opening side on showing distribution and overall strength overlooks the location of honor cards.  When honor cards of the opening side are concentrated in their short suits and not their long suits the offensive potential of the hand will be overstated.  Nonetheless, I have found cooperative doubles to be among the more useful conventions I have adopted.  I hope this post, combined with a reading of Martin’s article, will help demonstrate why cooperative doubles can be so useful.  Martin also explains the use of a cooperative double by the opening 1NT bidder. I like that use, too, although it can backfire more frequently than the use of cooperative doubles by responder.

Just sitting around …

In our last club game, we earned 7 tops of 11 out of 24 boards.  So, we must have done something spectacular, right?

Well, no.  We mostly just sat around and watched our opponents misdeclare or overbid (six of the seven tops were on defense).  And that seems, in my experience, to be the normal anatomy of tops: wait for the opponents to make errors and then capitalize upon them.  Is there any skill involved?  Mostly luck, I think, but maybe a little skill enters in three different ways:  (1) compete aggressively enough to cause your opponents to make “guesses”; (2) know when “enough is enough”, and don’t make a further move after you have forced the opponents to make a “guess”; and (3) don’t perseverate over the inevitable bad result but instead focus on the long run.

A categorization of the tops:

  • Opponents misdeclared: Boards 2, 6 (where a poor opening lead by our side made the correct declarer play clearer than normal), 26 (pure luck here: opponents bid a reasonable slam, a better opening lead would have led to a legitimate set, while the lead made at the table allowed declarer to make, but a preemptive call by our side caused declarer to [reasonably] misguess the lie of the trump suit and go down “illegitimately”)
  • Opponents overbid: Boards 7 (where our preemptive bidding might have contributed), 8, and 16.
  • Opponents misdefended: Board 15 (a defender switched to a suit that enabled a game to make).

Typical was this hand:

Dealer: W

Vul: EW

North

T9532

5

52

AJ953

West

J8

KQJ763

Q764

T

East

AQ4

9

AT8

K87642

South

K76

AT842

KJ93

Q

West North East South
2 2♠! P 3♠!
P P Dbl All pass

NS seemed to have been on the same wavelength: North overbid and South underbid.  I did not catch a tempo issue, and so apparently their auction was based upon past style rather than unauthorized table action.  Len Aberbach as East showed good bidding judgment to double: his hand had all the elements of a successful defense, misfit for partner, fast tricks, control of trump suit.  I suspect he was disappointed, in fact, to see the K in dummy.

East led 9, won by dummy’s A.  Desperate for tricks, declarer ran the Q to East’s K (our first trick).  East returned the 8, declarer sluffed a red card, and West matched his partner’s color and rank by ruffing with the 8 (our second trick).  With another useful trump card available, West went for the cross-ruff by leading back the J.  East overruffed declarer’s 9 with the Q (our third trick) and returned another club.  The club was ruffed by the 6 and overruffed by the J (our fourth trick).  West returned the Q and East overruffed dummy’s T with the A for our fifth trick, four of them with trumps.  East cashed the A and +300 was our score.  Most common score our direction was 2, down one for -100.

This is a pretty mundane hand, but I know a few folks who would refrain from opening 2because of the possibility of missing a better fit in diamonds.  My approach is not to look too severely for reasons not to preempt, but instead look for reasons to cause the opponents to make guesses by preempting often.  Entering the auction here (which is nearly automatic; I am not suggesting that opening 2is especially aggressive) worked well for my side, but sometimes entering an auction will backfire.  On another board during this session, I overcalled a 1 opening by my RHO in second chair with 1, at favorable vulnerability, with J9743 KJT4 K9 Q9.  Eventually my LHO declared 3NT.  Partner made the obvious lead of the Q from Q6 and found the spade suit around the table K82, my J9743, and AT5.  The T was declarer’s ninth trick and we earned a near-zero.  Will that stop me from overcalling the next time on a similar bad five card suit?  No, it won’t.  I think that in the long run introducing the five card spade suit will allow us to win boards by effectively competing; the experience of producing this bad result by inducing partner to lead the Q is something I can remember but not something that I will react to precipitously.

Looking for favorable holdings …

Both notrump hands that I declared as West at yesterday’s club duplicate game were interesting, with hopes realized for favorable opposing holdings in a key suit.  Each of the hands also contained some difficult bidding decisions.

West

AKQJ

865

JT4

JT9

East

42

AT42

Q732

K64

West North East South
P P 1
P 1 P P
1NT All pass

I am not reluctant to overcall a four card major, but only when my suit is good (definitely true here), my hand is good (not true here) and, if applicable, I have poor support for the other major (not true here).  I passed 1 and then decided to balance with 1NT.

North led the 5.  I was much surprised to see partner’s hand show with four hearts.  I would not have expected East to have passed 1 with a doubleton heart.  Perhaps she was dealt a hand that might have considered opening 2, but she pulled in the reins a bit?  (Or maybe 2 would not have been a weak two?; I should have checked.)  At any rate, the first trick proceeds small, seven, won in hand.  With few choices for trick development available, I advanced the J at Trick 2.  South won the K and returned a spade.  I won the K and led a club toward dummy.  North rose with the A — South following suit with the 2 — and then led a third round of clubs, dummy winning with the K and South discarding a small diamond.  Now it is pretty clear that South’s distribution in 4=2=5=2.  Probably her heart doubleton includes at least one honor.  I led a small diamond toward my hand, and was allowed to win the T.  If there is a heart unblock to be had, perhaps it will be harder for South to foresee the earlier I make a heart play?  So, thinking, I played to the A in dummy and was pleased to see only small hearts played.  I next played the remaining three high spades and exited with a heart.   Success, as South won and had to give dummy a second diamond trick at the end, my side scoring nine tricks (2 of each minor plus the five top majors).  70% board.  Not the best defense, but one has to take advantage of opportunities, too.  Here was the whole hand:

Dealer: N

Vul: E-W

North

T53

QJ97

6

AQ853

West

AKQJ

865

JT4

JT9

East

42

AT42

Q732

K64

South

9876

K3

AK985

72

Next …

West

8

QT984

J92

AQ93

East

KQT7653

K

KQ4

JT

West North East South
P P 1 P
1NT (semi-forcing) P 3 P
3NT All pass

Partner had two tough bidding decisions on the hand.  I can see an argument for either a 2 rebid or the chosen 3 rebid (prefer partner’s table choice).  Passing 3NT seems unusual to me, because of both the seventh spade and the absence of aces.  The absence of aces suggests that one might need the protection of the trump suit to knock out side cards while setting up tricks outside the trump suit.  All that aside, I now had to declare 3NT.  What is your plan, with lead of 5?

At the table, I won the K in dummy and next floated the J, with multiple options available, although none of them certain:

  • If the J is covered by the K, win in hand and play on spades.  How to play the spades is a problem.  If North has a two- or three-card holding that includes the jack, the winning play is to finesse the T, followed, as soon as allowed, by a high honor.  But if North has a two card holding that includes the ace or a three card holding that includes the ace but not the jack, the winning play is to play a high honor first, but then you have to guess whether to play small next (wins when the ace is doubleton) or a second high honor next (wins when the jack is doubleton).  One guess seems better than two, and so I think the best spade play is to finesse the T.  If the spade suit lies favorably, the spade suit will be good for six winners and only one loser.  When added to the three established clubs and the diamond already in, that is ten winners, losing only to the three missing aces.
  • If the J is not covered but wins, one might run the risk of assuming that the K is offside  … often table action of the opponents will provide a clue.  That would mean that 4 is off (at least) one trick in each suit.  Win a second club with the ace and finesse the T.  If you find a favorable spade lie, you will have nine tricks ready to run and the opponents will have only three aces and the K to cash.
  • If the J loses to the K, three club tricks are established and any return by North might help you establish a trick in a side suit.  Most damning return might be a small heart.

The J was won by North’s K and a heart returned.  South won the A and returned another heart.  At this point I am at risk even if I get the spade suit right:  maybe I should have won the opening lead in hand and tried spades right away?  If I rise with the Q, then I can lose not only K and A already lost, but also the two pointed suit aces and the J.  Finessing the T is foisted.

Fortunately, the T wins this trick and the T the next trick.  I force out the A and soon claim nine tricks, losing one trick in each suit.  Maybe partner’s pass of 3NT is better than I had credited?  94% board, on this layout:

Dealer: W

Vul: N-S

North

J2

632

A875

K862

West

8

QT984

J92

AQ93

East

KQT7653

K

KQ4

JT

South

A94

AJ75

T63

754

I was lucky on each hand, to find a favorable heart holding with South of Kx on the first hand (and no unblock), and to find a favorable spade lie on the second hand.

Control Freak

Sometimes in bridge it is OK to become a control freak.  Points can be won and lost by controlling the defense.

A recent club duplicate presented two hands for taking control of the defense by limiting partner’s options and a third hand for not ceding control of a key suit to declarer.

We extracted the maximum from some overzealous opponents on this hand.

Dealer: N

Vul: N-S

North

KJ64

AK

A2

KQT43

East

9872

64

KQ76

A65

West North East South
1 (a) P 1
3 (b) 4 (c) 5 (d) P
P Dbl All pass

(a) I wanted to be able to show both my suits and so risked being passed in 1.  I had planned on making a game forcing jump shift rebid of 2 had partner responded 1of a red suit.

(b) weak jump overcall

(c) after hearing my partner’s 1response, I was concerned that my anticipated rebid of 4 would actually understate my values, but the overcall bought me another round by enabling me to cue bid.

(d) perhaps confusing “favorably not vulnerable” with “invulnerable”?

On lead against 5X, I cashed two high trumps and then switched to K.  The ace was won in dummy, partner and declarer following with the 7 and 8, respectively.  A small diamond was played to J of declarer and my A.  (Ducking one round might have been better defense.)  Wanting partner to win the next trick and return a club, I tried to control the defense by leading my ♠J.  Partner would probably have found the right defense anyway, but this play made it easier for him to win the A and return a club.  Two club tricks gave us six tricks overall for a four trick set and a top board of +800, beating spade games our direction.

The whole hand was:

Dealer: N

Vul: N-S

North

KJ64

AK

A2

KQT43

West

Q

QT98753

J5

J98

East

9872

64

KQ76

A65

South

AT53

J2

T9843

72

A similar situation arose on another board, but with a much less satisfying matchpoint result.

Dealer: S

Vul: Both

North

Q62

KQJ852

T74

K

West

KJT984

T

KQ953

T

East

3

76

AJ2

QJ97643

South

A75

A943

86

A852

West North East South
1NT (12-14)
2 (spades + minor) 4 P P
4 Dbl 4NT (tell me your minor) P
5 Dbl All pass

After the spirited auction I led the K, holding the lead.  Not being sure how many rounded cards declarer holds, I decided to pass the buck to partner by leading the J at Trick 2.  He would win the A, I thought, and might be in a better position to control the defense by deciding whether to force declarer or give me a club ruff.  Well, partner knew the rounded suit distribution exactly:  he had heard me show at least six hearts and so “knew” declarer had only the one heart just played.  And he had a view of all thirteen clubs.  Between that information and the auction, he could pretty well guess the total distribution.  Partner decided that our best chance was to negotiate a club ruff while he retained control of that suit with the ace.  Accordingly, he chose to lead back a small club.  Declarer considered this trick for several moments and then decided to ruff with the 9.  I overruffed for our third trick.  (That might be a mistake, since allowing declarer to “draw trumps ending in dummy”, when dummy has a good suit, is not often a good strategy for defense.)  With trumps now splitting 2-2, declarer could draw trumps, set up dummy’s clubs, lose a spade and then reach dummy with a spade ruff to run the club suit.  A two trick set for +500 result (perhaps other defenses would lead to the same result) was a poor matchpoint result when compared to pairs going +620 with our hand.

The third hand, companion board to the one above, represented a different form of defensive control, the failing to relinquish control of declarer’s long side suit.

Dealer: W

Vul: None

North

A8752

K94

KJ52

J

West

KQJT6

AQT83

Q

K7

East

9

76

AT973

A8654

South

43

J52

864

QT932

West North East South
1 P 1NT P
3 P 3NT P
4 All pass

I tried a forcing defense – too many diamond ruffs in declarer’s hand might cause her to lose control of trumps, I had hoped – by leading a small diamond.  Fortunately for my partnership, declarer decided to win the lead in dummy rather than let the lead run around to her stiff Q.  She next led the 9 from dummy, overtaking with a higher honor in hand.  With declarer marked with at least five spades on the auction, I knew the A was going to win a trick eventually.  Thinking that retaining control of the side suit would complicate play for declarer, I ducked.  The duck must have been smooth because declarer played as if she were trying to ruff out partner’s A.  Declarer next led 6 from hand.  I covered with the ♠7, allowing her to ruff in dummy as partner followed with his last spade.  Now declarer ruffed a diamond to hand.  She played a spade and I ducked again.  Declarer ruffed in dummy with dummy’s last trump but partner overruffed with the J.  Partner might have continued the force with a diamond here but he chose to return a club which declarer won in hand.  Declarer now led the Q from hand and I won the K (our second trick).  I continued the force with the K, ruffed by declarer in hand, reaching this position:

Dealer: W

Vul: None

North

A8

94

J

West

QJ

AT

7

East

♠ —

♥ —

T9

A86

South

5

QT93

Declarer forced out my A for our third trick and I returned J which declarer ruffed with the T.  Declarer could cash the other high spade, but my long heart was going to take one of the last two tricks for a one-trick set.  The analysis is pretty complex (at least too complex for me!) but I think that declarer’s success revolves not around the spade suit — the defense has an answer to her spade plays — but around the diamond suit.  If declarer can avoid being tapped twice in diamonds, she can, I think, make her contract.  Basically, that would require declarer to have bravely/dangerously ducked the diamond opening lead to her stiff Q; even if I had led the K to pin the Q, we could only tap her once because the T in dummy would be master of the third round of the suit.  At any rate, keeping control of the spade suit by not playing the A prematurely made declarer’s play difficult.  Pleasantly, the one trick set was also a top board for my partnership.

So … being a control freak in bridge can pay off!

Culbertson’s Rule of Hand Evaluation #2

Jeff Rubens defines the Rule as “your hand is worth an invitation to game (or slam) if a perfect minimum holding from partner will make it a laydown”.

Here’s a couple more recent hands to which one might apply Culbertson’s Rule.

In third hand, you open 1 on ♠AK75  A  Q64  QJT65.  LHO overcalls 1.  Your partner bids 1NT, 7-10 HCP by partnership agreement.  After a pass by RHO, do you bid on?

Partner would be expected to have some combination of the  KQJ.  Because the QJ makes the suit most difficult for the opponents to attack, let’s “give” him those three HCP.  You also would welcome a filler in clubs, so let’s “give” partner the ♣K.  That’s a total of six “perfect” points out of the seven that is the agreed bottom range for his 1NT response. The extra HCP that seems to fit best with our hand is the J, and we can accompany that with T, perhaps.  So, overall, our “perfect minimum” for partner might be xxx, QJxx  JTxx  Kx.  Now, how might the play go, since a benefit of Culbertson’s Rule is that it integrates bidding with card play?  Assuming a start of a heart lead followed by knocking out the A, we have a total of 7 top tricks.  When in with the A, the opponents will presumably know not to continue hearts but will instead switch to a pointed suit.  Assume that pointed suit is spades.  We can win the spade, run the clubs, and begin to knock out the high honors, and then volley between spades and diamonds for the next two tricks.  After ten tricks (one heart, five clubs, two spades and two diamonds), the defense is on lead with a high diamond in a three card end position; we have won seven tricks.  If it is RHO who is on lead and is voided in spades, then we are gin: we must win a heart and a diamond while the best RHO can do is win the K.  If, on the other hand, LHO is on lead at Trick 11, we will probably go set as he can cash a high spade and then lead a heart to his partner’s king for the fifth trick of the defense.

All in all, given “declarer advantage”, I think a raise to 2NT (surely the raise is invitational and not some sort of minor-two suiter, right?) is justified.  Partner should be well-placed to make a decision with a hand that is neither a clear minimum nor a clear maximum, because he will highly value a secondary honor in hearts (such as the jack) and a supporting club honor.

Another hand for applying Culbertson’s Rule.  You hear a third hand opening bid of 1.  You hold AQJT5 983 AQT7 5.  You overcall 1.  LHO makes a negative double.  Partner raises to 2.  RHO bids 3.  Your call?

Well, you expect partner to hold a doubleton heart on the auction.  You also expect that all diamond finesses will work.  You “give” partner four spades to the king.  Let’s say his hand is Kxxx xx xxx xxxx.  That might not be enough for a raise.  But the hand has only three losers if the diamond finesses work and trumps split.  Surely, you must be worth a game try (presumably a maximal double on this auction).  Again, partner should be well-placed to make a good decision: surely he will value a trump honor and the fourth or longer trumps and he will similarly know to discount honors in the heart suit.

Partner will not, of course, always (some would say “never”) hold perfect cards … but then he does not always own a minimum, either.  Therein, lies one of the beauties of Culbertson’s Rule: you assume that the two assumptions — one favorable and one unfavorable — balance out, thus justifying your decision whether or not to invite.

Culbertson’s Rule of Hand Evaluation

Many methods of hand evaluation abound: Law of Total Tricks (LOTT), the counter to LOTT in Lawrence-Wirgren book, Losing Trick Count (LTC), and, of course, point count.

I think all of those methods pale in comparison to Culbertson’s Rule, which I had read many, many years ago in Jeff Rubens’ great book The Secrets of Winning Bridge.  Rubens defines the Rule as “your hand is worth an invitation to game (or slam) if a perfect minimum holding from partner will make it a laydown”.

What makes Culbertson’s Rule better, IMHO, than alternatives is that it gets the bidder to be thinking about integrating the play into the bidding: what cards do I need from partner (that are consistent with the auction as a whole) to make the contract I am aiming for laydown?  The “perfect minimum” aspect of the Rule keeps a player from getting too ambitious: if you are counting on partner to have a perfect maximum, you will frequently be disappointed; and if are counting on partner to have a hugely imperfect minimum, you are going to miss too many good games or slams.

What brings this discussion to the blog is this hand: A  AJ9632  J9  KJ83.  You open 1 and partner raises to 2.  Are you worth a game try?  Culbertson’s Rule thinking might follow the lines of well, if partner holds Kxxx and Q, game should be pretty close to laydown, right?  Your methods will determine how you try for game, but since a perfect minimum of 5 HCP might produce a near-laydown game, surely some sort of game try is in order.

Another example (slightly adjusted, for author license) from the same club game as the hand above.  Let’s say that you are playing weak notrumps, which causes you to open 1 holding KQ84 K2 AJ5 KJ54.  LHO doubles and partner raises to 2.  RHO passes.  Do you bid more on your balanced 17 count?  Well, applying Culbertson’s rule, you “give” partner ATxxx and Q, fitting nicely with your two diamond honors.  You expect a heart lead, and you can quickly see that 3NT is far from laydown.  Ergo, you pass.  Sure, partner might have enough for game because his auction is not inconsistent with his owning the same hand as shown above but with the A instead of the Q.  But that hand is not a perfect minimum and so you should not bid on.