Visualizing the Play

July 18th, 2014  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  No Comments 

“We had a two-suit fit.”  “I had undisclosed values”.  “I thought my honor in your opened suit would be extra valuable”.

All of those comments – comments that might be made by someone who just overbid – can be well-considered … but only if they are placed in the context of, as Karen Walker states in her series of articles in Bridge Bulletin about Habits of Effective Bidders, “Visualizing the Play”.  Without considering how the factor that produces the comment is likely to affect the play of the hand, the comments are just excuse-laden platitudes and not bridge thinking.

Here is an example I witnessed.

Your partner opens 1♦ in second chair, at favorable vulnerability, and you are blessed with a 20 count: ♠KQ98, ♥AQ9, ♦T, ♣AKQ52.   Playing 2/1, you respond 2♣.  And you hear partner rebid 2♠!  In your partnership, 2♠ neither promises nor denies extra strength.  But since you play weak notrumps, it does show an unbalanced hand: either partner has 5 or more diamonds along with his four spades or he is exactly 4=4=4=1. 

Bidding 4NT (keycard) seems reasonable and you make that choice.  Partner responds 5♥, showing the missing two key cards but no ♠Q.  Holding all six key cards, you might as well bid 5NT (asking for cheapest king) next: perhaps if partner has extras (such as an extra long, strong diamond suit), his hearing that your side has all six key cards is all he needs to hear to bid a grand (say, with Axxx, xx, AKQxxx, x).  Or partner with enough general extras (say both red kings) might bid the grand directly. 

Assuming partner does not bid 7♠ himself, what are your planned rebids? 

Here is where your ability at “Visualizing the Play” benefits. 

If partner bids 6♥, you can place him on a minimum something akin to Axxx, Kx/Kxx, Axxxx, xx/ x.  Assuming that trumps split 3-2, you have off the top four trump tricks, three heart tricks, one diamond trick, and three club tricks for eleven tricks.  Hoping for two more tricks via a ruff and/or a long trick or two in clubs, seems like a reasonable shot.  You anticipate some variation of: heart lead won with K, draw three rounds of trumps, play three high clubs and a club ruff and reach your hand via a diamond ruff to play the long club for a thirteenth trick.  (As Rodwell would denote: 5 [including a ruff]+3+1+4 = 13.) 

If partner bids 6♦, your minimum for partner is something akin to Axxx, xx/xxx, AKxxx, xx/x.  Without your ♥Q being a sure trick, prospects are not so rosy in a grand, and you can figure that out by “Visualizing the Play”. 

Finally, if your partner bids only 6♠, you just hope he can make his contract, because he might have something like AJxx, xx/xxx, AQJxx, xx/x (or worse, take away a pointed suit jack).  Grand can hardly be better than on a diamond finesse. 

When you are in an unusual contract …

July 12th, 2014  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  No Comments 

Playing weak notrumps, I opened one on ♠Q8, ♥KQJ6, ♦AQ52, ♣T75 on Board 17 of Friday’s matchpoint game at the local club.  Three passes followed.  The opening lead was the ♠5, to the 4, T, and won by my ♠Q. Read the rest of this entry »

Unlikeable

June 28th, 2014  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  6 Comments 

A fine player, but sort of an unlikeable table participant, my LHO (playing with a client) is in her normal, inconsiderate mode at the club.

Sitting North, on the first board of the round, she participated in the following auction:

After losing the ♦A and three trump tricks (my partner held KJTx), she now proceeds to criticize her partner for failing to bid 3NT at her fourth turn. Really? The hand with Qx in the unbid suit is the one who should have grabbed the notrump and not the one who held AKxx?

On the last board of the round, she turns her criticism toward my partner. Hard to replicate the voice inflection in writing, but her comment was definitely of the “you don’t know what you are doing” variety and not the “I wasn’t counting on that” variety, when she says to my partner after the hand, “you made a takeout double (of her 1♣ opening bid) with three clubs”. Yes, he did, at favorable vulnerability holding T8xx, AQx, KQ9, Q9x. Geesh!

Not to Remember

June 3rd, 2014  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  1 Comment 

How do you play Unusual-over-Unusual? 

Partner opens 1♥ and RHO overcalls 2NT, showing the minors.  My views are that the easiest to remember agreement is “lower=lower”, so that 3♣ shows inv+ for hearts, and 3♦ shows inv+ for spades; that the best agreement is that lower shows fourth suit and higher shows limit+ for opened suit (because one needs the extra space more severely to explore strain than to determine level); and that a frequent, but I think inferior, agreement is that lower shows limit+ for the opened suit and higher shows the fourth suit.

But it matters little, and so I generally subscribe to the agreement “whatever partner wants”.  Plus, I like to think that I have a better-than-average memory for agreements.

Well, maybe I should reconsider that self-evaluation.  Because I confronted the problem of not remembering “whatever partner wants”.

Twice.

Playing in irregular partnerships in an out-of-area regional, I tried to resolve the problem by applying the principle of Avoid a Misunderstanding.

On the first hand, in a pairs event, I held AKQx, KQxx, x, Qxxx opposite a 1♥ opening by partner and a 2NT overcall.  Not remembering which minor suit cue bid shows heart support, I decided to double.  (OK.  True Confession time.  Having exhausted my memory bank by trying to remember what we had agreed, at the table, I passed.  But I meant to double.)  My LHO bid 3♣, without apparent concern.  Two passes followed.  RHO looked like a solid citizen, someone who would not bid 2NT without at least five cards in each minor suit.  Ergo, I read the clubs around the table as 4=3=1=5, meaning partner has a stiff club.  Now I decided to bid 4NT, which was keycard (that agreement I know I remembered).  Not unreasonably, my chosen parlay of bids confused partner a bit, and he took more than a moderate time before responding.  When he responded 5♦ (three keycards … I hope), I placed partner with something akin to xxx, Axxxx, Axxx, A and bid 7♥.  +2210 was the score for an excellent matchpoint result.

Having successfully surmounted the problem on the hand above, I felt better prepared when a similar problem arose during the Swiss teams.  Not remembering my U/U agreements with a different partner, I heard the same auction as before.  This time, I held Axx, ATx, T8xx, Axx, and this time I really did double.  LHO squeaked 3♣ and two passes followed.  I jumped to 4♥ and two passes followed that bid.  RHO, a good player but perhaps one whose woman’s intuition was a bit out-of-tune that day, surprisingly bid 5♣ in passout seat.  I doubled that and three passes followed.  Partner led a heart through dummy’s x, Q, A9xxxx, QJT9x.  Partner and I made a few bad guesses on defense, and converted our possible potential for +1700 (down seven, NV!  LHO had only three minor suit cards, which included the stiff ♦Q) into +1100.  Still, that was a spectacular result and resulted in a very nice IMP result in a match we won by a large margin.

I wonder if it is better Not to Remember.

IMP pairs event at the club

April 29th, 2014  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  1 Comment 

IMP pairs events are notoriously random.  I am not saying that IMP pairs events are not fun – I rather enjoy them – but the results one receives are so dependent upon random matters such as whom you play on the “boards that count”.  That the boards that count mean so much is the consequence of so many boards producing hardly any significant potential IMP swings at all.  

When I think of IMP pairs events, I think of a post mortem I conducted with a friend between sessions of such an event at a past NYC NABC.  We were each sitting the same direction in the first session.  As we progressed to a particular board, I complained, “Oh, this one was bad; our opponents got to the vulnerable 6♣ slam and we suffered a big loss to the field, winning only the ♥A.”  My friend chimed in, “They got to the slam against us, too, and went down one trick, for a big gain to the field.”  Upon inquiring I learned that the declarer against my friend had played the trump suit of Qxx opposite AJ9xxxx by playing small to the jack.  Sure enough, KTx was in the slot and my friend’s side won both the ♥A and a trump trick.  Of course, the declarer against me and my partner was familiar with the safety play of leading the Q and so lost no trump tricks.

Well, in yesterday’s IMP pairs at the club, my partner and I were lucky and not unlucky.  Here are two examples.

I led the ♥A and partner encouraged.  Declarer decided to drop the ♥J.  I switched to the ♠7 and declarer successfully finessed the ♠Q.  Declarer cashed the ♣A and led a diamond to the ♦A in order to lead a second trump.  After long thought, he went up with the ♣K, dropping the queen.  Next declarer led the ♥Q from dummy.  Partner flew with the king and returned his last diamond.  Declarer ruffed in dummy and played the ♥T ruffing in his hand!  Now he had two losing diamonds and only one trump to take care of them.  Down one.

No one else in the field bid 5♣.  And so, while our opponents deserved a big win for bidding to +600, the failure to pitch diamonds on good hearts converted their score to a big loss for them/win for us by suffering -100.

And then a more subtle, but equally undeserved, pick up for my partnership on Board 15, where declarer is relatively new to competitive bridge, I think. 

I would not have replicated my partner’s decision to pass 1♥X, but rather would have bid cue bid 2♥ on my way to 4♠.  How did partner’s decision work out?

Well, here was the play.

Partner led a diamond.  Declarer won the jack, cashed the ♦A and led a third diamond to partner’s king.  Partner exited with a spade to my ace as declarer played small from dummy and chose the odd option of playing the king from her hand.  I cashed two top clubs, partner pitching spades on each, and then led a third club.  Partner ruffed declarer’s queen with the ♥7 and exited with a spade.  Declarer won perforce with dummy’s queen and advanced the ♥J, losing, as should have been expected, to partner’s ♥Q.  That was our sixth trick (one diamond, one spade, two clubs, one club ruff, and the ♥Q).  Partner exited with his last spade.  Declarer was trump tight in the four-card end position and partner won two more trump tricks from his AT8.  Down two for +500 and a small pickup on the “normal score” of +450.

But why, given the auction, did declarer choose to lead the ♥J from dummy, when she could have chosen to lead through partner toward the ♥J?  Had declarer kept the ♠K instead of unblocking that card on the first spade lead, she could have won partner’s spade exit in her hand and then led a heart toward dummy’s jack.  Either the ♥J would win a trick or partner would win his ♥Q on air.  Either way, declarer gets one more trick and earns a big gain for being -200 against the “normal score” of -450.

Was this enough for us to win the event?  Sadly, not even close!

Making 5 clubs

April 3rd, 2014  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  2 Comments 

After a rather enthusiastic auction, you are declaring 5♣ on this layout, at favorable vulnerability.  (Board 28, March 28 morning game at Reyim.)

You notice that your side has only 16 HCP, while the rather-silent opponents have 24 HCP.  You note three possible spade losers and two certain heart losers.  Given five losers in a contract that can only afford two losing tricks, you make the favorable assumption that trumps split 2-1.

Further investigation leads to the conclusion that you are happy that you escaped a trump lead.  You would be unable to ruff three spades had the opponents led a club and continued a second club when in lead later.

You are pretty certain that diamonds are 3-5, based upon the auction.  If spades are 4-4, you need only two spade ruffs because then your fifth spade will be a winner.  You also need only two spade ruffs if spades are 5-3 and the three-card holding includes the QJ.  The odds are against the favorable spade holdings.  Are there other options?

The option I pursued at the table would land the contract if South had 3=3=5=2 distribution.  I cross-ruffed pointed suit cards for the first six tricks.  When in dummy with the third spade ruff, I cashed the ♣K, drawing a small trump from South and a trump honor from North.  I had won the first seven tricks.  I led a diamond to hand, ruffing with the ♣T from my remaining ♣AT, hoping for my eighth trick (meaning that North has no remaining clubs), and then to cash the ♣A to draw the last trump (from South) for a ninth trick and cash the two high spades for a tenth and eleventh trick.  (My plan would also work, although not be necessary, if South were 4=2=5=2.)

Alas, at the table South had been dealt a hand of 4=3=5=1 distribution.  North overruffed the ♣T with the remaining high club honor and commenced for the partnership to cash two heart tricks for down one.

Why did not South balance with a double instead of 1♦?  I don’t know.

In case readers find the table results to be interesting … The board was played eleven times at the club. Ten times my West hand was the declarer in a club contract. (The eleventh time NS played in 4♦X, down one trick [only!?] for +200 EW.) The ten club contracts were comprised of one 6♣, three 5♣ (once doubled), and six club partials (once doubled).

Nine of the ten club contract declarers won eleven tricks. Only I managed to win only ten tricks! 

I submitted this hand as a play problem to BridgeWinners website, a fascinating destination at which I spend far too much time.  http://bridgewinners.com/article/view/making-5c/?cj=first#cfirst.  You will find there some really interesting perspectives on plans that might be pursued by declarer. 

Strip Tease

March 24th, 2014  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  2 Comments 

Following the premise that stripping a hand in a suit contract is usually wise play, Board 1 in today’s club game bore play interest.

Best play (alas not quite what I did at the table) to strip the hand is now ♥A and a small heart.  RHO would win and likely continue a spade (perhaps not best).  Backing your judgment about the position of the ♠K, you rise with the spade ace and continue with two top clubs from dummy, probably underplaying the ♣9 on one of them.  Clubs split 2-2.  Now you ruff the third heart and exit with a spade.  As you anticipated, LHO wins the ♠K and is endplayed, in this position:

On the good news front, LHO did have a natural heart lead and you are rewarded with a good score on the board by having avoided notrump, when most declarers guessed to take a losing finesse in spades, where two extra tricks might be available, rather than a winning finesse in diamonds, where only one extra trick is available.

 Board 2, against the same pair, continued the theme of strip tease.

As dealer at favorable vulnerability, I chose to open 1♥ on 

After LHO’s pass, partner raised to 2♥ (not constructive) and RHO doubled.  This is exactly the auction I had hoped for.  I re-raised to 3♥, hoping that partner would not take my bid as a game try. After two passes, RHO shrugged and passed.  Good.  Or so I thought.

The opening lead was the ♦4.

Culbertson’s Rule Stop Sign

January 25th, 2014  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  4 Comments 

I am a big fan of a bidding tool called Culbertson’s Rule, having written about many applications of the rule elsewhere in this blog.

Culbertson’s Rule (from Jeff Rubens’ classic book The Secrets of Winning Bridge) says to invite game (or slam) when the contract could be cold opposite a well-fitting minimum for partner’s bidding. 

Here was a recent hand where application of Culbertson’s Rule would prove useful.

You are playing agreements that are non-KS but include opening 12-14 1NT.  Under your agreements, an auction such as 1♣-1♠; 2♠ is one of three hand types: a three card raise in an unbalanced hand such as a hand of 3=4=1=5 distribution; a four card raise in a hand of 4=2=2=5 distribution; or a four card raise in a “strong notrump” hand that you have chosen to devalue for suit contract purposes, possibly because of possession of lots of minor honors in side suits, cards that are more valuable at notrump than at suit contracts.  As  a result of your agreements that opener’s raise to 2♠ shows minimum range hands (unlike KS style where the single raise promises four trumps and at least 15 points including support points), you play that opener’s raise to 3♠ is equivalent in strength to a standard four card support jump raise of 16-18 points including support, and can often include (non-devalued) “strong notrump” hands with four card support.

Your partner opens 1♣ and raises your 1♠ response to 3♠.  What is your call holding ♠K754, ♥K5, ♦KJ, ♣KT963?

You have 13 HCP, lots of control cards, a possible two-suit fit, and possibly helpful distribution.  However, you also have only one key card.  If, as a partnership, you assume that for slam you need five of the six key cards, your partner must supply four of them.  So … let’s “give” partner the ♠AQ, ♣A, and a red ace.  That is 14 prime HCP, allowing him, for his Culbertson’s Rule well-fitting minimum, to own two more points by virtue of either high cards or distribution.  Let’s say that partner holds ♠AQxx, ♥Axx, ♦xx, ♣AJxx; that fills the Culbertson’s bill.

How good is slam opposite that hand?  Not bad.  Given that your diamond holding is protected from being led through at Trick 1, you can make slam if both black suits behave: You can take five clubs, two hearts and a heart ruff, and four more spade tricks for twelve tricks in total.

But the language “if both black suits behave” means that slam is not nearly cold.  A 4-1 spade split is one problem, finding the ♣Q is another.  In the aggregate, these potential problems can be evaluated as sufficiently possible to exclude the slam from being “cold”.  Applying Culbertson’s Rule, this means that you should not even try for slam and a signoff bid of 4♠ is appropriate.

At the table, the player holding this hand chose to bid 4NT.  When opener owned up to only two key cards plus the ♠Q, responder, recognizing that the partnership was off two key cards, signed off in 5♠.  Although 5♠ was not a bad contract opposite opener’s actual hand of ♠QJT8, ♥J8, ♦AQ5, ♣AQ87, it was more than slightly less safe than 4♠.  And, as the opponent’s cards lay, unmakeable.

Satisfying overtrick

January 14th, 2014  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  1 Comment 

Playing matchpoints at the club, vul v not (Board 25, morning duplicate 1-13-14 at Reyim), I was dealt ♠Q92, ♥AJ632, ♦KT83, ♣4.  RHO was the dealer and, surprisingly to me, she opened 1♥.  I passed and so did LHO.  Partner balanced with a double, redoubled by RHO.

I don’t like my spots for passing 1♥X, much less XX.  Any thoughts I might have had about jumping to 2NT were mitigated by the redouble.  I advanced 1NT and that became the final contract.

Dummy’s queen was topped by the king.

With my side’s black tens protecting me some from attack in those suits, I chose to let the ♥K hold the trick.  A heart was continued, I won with the ♥A and LHO followed suit with the ♥5.

I led the ♦8 to dummy’s queen, LHO playing the 2 and RHO the nine.  RHO pitched a small heart on the diamond return to my king.

Next I cashed the ♥J, played the ♦3 (but intended to play the ♦T) to the marked finesse of the ♦7, and then played the ♦A.  RHO pitched one card in each black suit.  I led a spade off of dummy and RHO flew with the ♠K, cashed the ♠A, and then led a third spade to my good ♠Q.  I have won one spade, two hearts, and four diamonds, and lost one heart and two spades.

The three card end position was this.

I exited with a heart, pitching dummy’s spade.  RHO won the ♥9 and played ♣A and a club to dummy’s king for the overtrick and all 11 matchpoints.

Can you read the end position?

December 24th, 2013  ~  Jeff Lehman  ~  4 Comments 

At a club matchpoint game (board 9 of December 23 Temple Reyim morning game, directions reversed to show South as declarer), your opponents are a Grand Life Master to your right and a client to your left.  The opening lead is the ♦8.  You insert the jack, which loses to RHO’s king.  RHO returns the ♥3.  You choose to rise with the ♥K (do you?), as LHO plays the ♥9.  You pass the ♣J, losing to RHO’s king.  Back comes another small heart.  You again rise (do you?), this time with the ♥A, pitching a spade from dummy.  You play a second club to dummy’s queen.  RHO pitches a diamond.  Ycch, the club finesse you earlier lost was to a singleton king.

You cash out your three winning diamonds.  LHO pitches a club and then, after some long thinking, a spade.  From dummy, you pitch a club.  RHO pitches a heart on the last diamond.

Time to assess what is going on.  In the five card end position below where declarer is on lead, you have lost two tricks (to the minor suit kings) and won six tricks (one club, three diamonds, and two hearts).  You know that LHO was dealt five clubs and two diamonds and that RHO was dealt four diamonds and one club.

LHO holds ♣Tx and three major suit cards.  RHO holds five major suit cards.  Certainly indications are that RHO was dealt at least five hearts.

You also know that LHO cannot profitably lead clubs, as that would allow you to take the marked finesse of the ♣9. 

The best play now depends upon LHO’s heart holding:

1. If LHO is out of hearts, you can throw her in with a club.  Lead to the ♠A in dummy, cash the ♣A and play the ♣9, pitching hearts from hand.  She would, under this scenario, have to then return a spade into your KJ.  You surely do not want to play hearts, because RHO can cash enough winners in that suit to set you.

2. If LHO is left with a stiff ♥Q, you can exit with your ♥7.  She would then be faced with the favorable-to-you options of leading a club to allow you to win the ♣9 or leading a spade into your KJ.

3.  If LHO is left with a singleton ♥J, you can also exit with your ♥7.  If LHO is allowed to win the trick, the play progresses exactly as in the above paragraph.  If RHO overtakes his partner’s ♥J with his ♥Q, your ♥T is established as the master heart.

4.  If LHO is left with a singleton small heart, you had better cash your winners in dummy, pitching a heart on the ♣A, and consider whether or not to risk the contract for the potential of an overtrick from a successful spade finesse. In this scenario, the club throw-in will cause you to lose three more tricks (and the contract) via the club and two top hearts; while exiting with a heart causes you to lose two hearts and to need a third spade trick just to make your contract.

So far as I can divine, the only clues are from LHO’s play of the ♥9 on the first round of hearts and her apparent consternation before pitching a spade on the last winning diamond.  In addition, you might read something about her spade holding into the fact that her opening lead was a diamond from a small doubleton rather than a spade from a probable three or four card holding that might or might not include the ♠Q.

Assuming you agree with the play to this stage (do you?), what play would you choose in the shown end position?

At the table, I tried the club throw in.  The actual hand was:

LHO cashed a winner in each rounded suit, and I claimed nine tricks only.  Ten tricks were available to me either by cashing winners, felling the ♠Q to establish my ♠J, or by exiting with a small heart from my hand.

I think, in retrospect, that I could have dismissed Scenario 1.  There would be no reason for LHO to hesitate before throwing a spade on the last diamond if she held no hearts, because she clearly cannot afford to pitch a club and so a spade discard is mandated.   In addition, I might have questioned the possibility of Scenario 4: would the client LHO have been up to understanding the importance of keeping a small heart as a bridge to her partner’s good hearts, as opposed to her focusing solely on maintaining her own possibly winning cards?  With benefit of hindsight, and the removal of time pressure, I think that I should have found the play of exiting with the ♥7.  At the table, that would have led to ten tricks without regard to who held the ♠Q.