Jeff Lehman

Shut up and count up …

Sometimes the source of matchpoints is quite surprising.

All vul at Friday’s club duplicate, in second chair I held JT  KQ432  AQ75  K7.  Nice potential for this hand, but considerably less so when my RHO opens 1NT.  With no singleton and the opponents being vulnerable I pass without much thought and so do the next two players.  I lead my fourth best heart and we eventually emerge with +200 for down two, taking one spade, four hearts, one club, and two diamonds.  Declarer took only his two major suit aces and three clubs.

 

Dealer: S, #7
Vul: Both
North
   JT
   KQ432
   AQ75
   K7
 
West
   A63
   A8
   KJT4
   AJ84
East
   Q987
   T97
   83
   T652
  South
   K542
   J65
   962
   Q93
 

 

The auction and defense seem pretty normal, but we are awarded 10 of the 11, count ‘em up, available matchpoints, losing only to the only other pair who defended 1NT.  Every other pair our direction declared, most of them declaring 2, with the maximum score for those pairs being +170.

I realize that most players come to the local dup not to defend but to declare, but bidding against a vulnerable strong notrump on a flattish hand seems poorly considered to me.  This result will not change my opinion.

He who guesses last …

A good principle of winning competitive bridge battles is to make the opponents take the last guess.  Here is a hand from Monday’s matchpoint club duplicate as an illustration.

Your partner opens 2 in second chair, both vul.  RHO overcalls 2 as you look at surprisingly good trump support: 8, JT653, AK8, 7532.  Your call?

Well, do you intend to bid on over the inevitable 4 by the opponents?  How about 5 by the opponents?  How many tricks at a heart contract might you make?

Let’s “give” partner a weak two bid that is consistent with second chair vul and corresponds to our suit lengths: I am going to guess at xxx, AKxxxx, xx, xx.  

On defense against spades, you appear to have two diamond tricks, and your side might have a heart trick or even a possible diamond ruff.  All in all, it seems pretty likely that the opponents can make ten tricks at a spade contract, while eleven is hard to evaluate.  Meanwhile on offense, you expect to lose one spade, no hearts, no diamonds and two clubs for ten tricks.  (I hope you are not looking to use the crutch of Total Trumps at this level.)  The above analysis suggests that you are willing to defend against 5♠ but not against 4

The point of all of this is simply that you should be considering all of the above factors before making your call.   And then make the call that makes the opponents have the last guess.  This means your correct call is 5.  Now, and not after the opponents have had the opportunity to exchange information.

Maybe you disagree with the guesses about how many tricks your side can produce on either offense or defense.  But the principle that you should bid right away to the highest level you intend to reach is a good one.

For what it is worth, the whole hand was:

 

Dealer: N #29
Vul: Both
North
   AJ75
   Q7
   Q9632
   94
 
West
   8
   JT653
   AK8
   7532
East
   932
   AK9842
   4
   QJT
  South
   KQT64
   —
   JT75
   AK86
 

 

What would North bid over a 5 call?  Well, if North is placed in the position of “giving” his partner a hand, he might choose something like KQxxxx, –, xx, AKxx.  5 is making opposite such hand, and if you morph a small diamond into the K, even slam can make.  Seems pretty hard to me for North to bypass a 5 call.  As you can see from the hand diagram, the unexpected matching diamond lengths of NS, missing the top two cards, maximizes the diamond losers of NS and causes 5 to be defeated by a diamond ruff.  Such is the impact of a well-chosen 5 call: that call put the pressure on the opponents to make a guess, and, as we all do, they might guess wrongly.

Elimination play

Playing 12-14 notrumps and negative doubles over notrump interference ala Phillip Martin (https://sites.google.com/site/psmartinsite/Home/bridge-articles/countering-notrump-interference), you conduct the following auction at unfavorable vulnerability (Board 28 of March 23 club game): 

 

North
   JT3
   AQ98
   Q5
   K642
South
   A865
   T4
   72
   AQJ95

 

West North East South
P 1NT (12-14) 2(a) Dbl (b)
P 2 (c)  2NT (d) 
3 P (e)  Dbl (f) 
P 4 (g) All pass  

(a) DONT, diamonds and a major.  Bid only after Break in Tempo (relevant in later discussion).

(b) negative double, presumptively a doubleton diamond in a 10-11 point balanced or semi-balanced hand

(c) opposite a doubleton diamond, must compete for the partial and not defend, natural to play opposite presumed three card or longer support

(d) scramble call, evidencing an unusual hand type for the negative double, probably 5-4 (any order) in black suits (but perhaps call might have been 2 with five spades and so it is clubs that can be inferred as the five card black suit?) and a doubleton heart as well as the doubleton diamond

(e) unwilling to defend when knowing that the opponents have nine diamonds, but also unclear how to compete: if partner has five spades and only four clubs, 3 is better than 4, but if partner has four spades and five clubs, 4♣ is better than 3.

(f) unwilling to defend an undoubled contract with combined 23 to 25 HCP.  Failure to have bid 3 suggests further that clubs is the five card black suit.

(g) reasonable conclusion 

 

East leads a club.  What is your line of play? 

I think that eliminating the red suits and playing for an end position in spades seems best. 

Timing is critical.  Win the trump in dummy and immediately finesse the Q.  Surprisingly, the finesse wins.  Cash the A, seeing only small cards.  Ruff a heart, felling the king.  Lead a club to your hand, learning that trumps are 2-2.  Ruff your last heart.  You have not yet lost a trick.  Now exit with a diamond, reaching this position.

North 
♠   JT3
♥   —
♦   Q
♣   64
South 
♠   A865
♥   —
♦   7
♣   9

Whether the opponents immediately cash the second diamond winner or not, they will ultimately be forced to either give you a ruff-sluff (you pitch a spade from hand, thereby limiting your spade losers to one, added to your two diamond losers in order to score your contract) or to open spades (if a nonhonor from East, you duck to West’s honor and then take the free finesse on next spade; and if a nonhonor from West, you play him for at least one honor by rising with the J). 

Rather more interestingly, what if the opponents should cash two diamonds at Tricks 1 and 2 and then switch to clubs? 

You would play as before – draw trumps, taking the heart finesse, etc. – to reach the same position as above, less one diamond in each hand.

North 
♠   JT3
♥   —
♦   —
♣   64
South 
♠   A865
♥   —
♦   —
♣   9

You are in the South hand, having ruffed your last heart.

Had that occurred, I think I would have been influenced by the hesitation exhibited by East before he ultimately bid 2.  East has counted out for four hearts and two clubs.  If his pointed suits were 5-2, would he have hesitated?  Or is the hesitation more consistent with his pointed suits being 6-1 and he was unsure whether to treat his hand as a diamond one-suiter or a diamond/heart two-suiter?  I would have guessed the latter (being influenced in part by West’s failure to have raised directly to 3 as he might well have if dealt four diamonds).  Having made such guess, I would have, in the position shown above, next played a small spade toward my JT.  That would endplay West if he were dealt both the spade honors.  And would alternatively have endplayed East if his singleton spade were an honor. 

How would that line of play worked? 

Not well, as this was the whole layout, with the only possible explanation for East’s hesitation being that he was just not sure whether entering the auction on a flattish hand was wise, even under the existing favorable vulnerability of his side.  As to an explanation of why West did not raise directly to 3?  I have no idea, and I hope such nonaction was not influenced by the break in tempo before his partner’s 2 call.

 

Dealer: W #23
Vul: NS
North
  JT3 
  AQ98
  Q5 
  K642 
 
West
   Q942
   K53
   KT93
   T8
East
   K7
   J762
   AJ864
   73
  South
   A865
   T4
   72
   AQJ95
 

 

On the actual layout, the winning play in the previous end position is not a small spade toward the JT but rather to cash the A and then duck a spade to endplay East.

Yes, I have noticed that the heart position being favorable to my side for three tricks (AQ and a ruff) that the opponents can be set two doubled tricks in 3.  Ah, well.  I still like our auction.

Three from sectional Swiss

Right cards in the right places

Without benefit of a computer, partner Rob Clark of Nashua, NH, came up with a winning evaluation of his hand on this deal from a recent sectional Swiss match, an evaluation not replicated by the top notch pair at the other table.

How do you value this hand?  xx  AT9xxx  xx  AQx?

The Kaplan and Rubens hand evaluator (you know, The Bridge World past and current editors) measures this hand as “worth” 13.05 points, thus a clear opening one bid.  (See http://www.jeff-goldsmith.org/cgi-bin/knr.cgi).   Valuing the quick tricks in his longest suits, Rob did open 1.

What about this hand as a responder to a 1 opening?  Axx  Jxxx  Axx  Kxx.  Game forcing (meaning Jacoby 2NT) or game invitational (meaning limit raise)?  I took the lower road, responding 3.  K&R agreed with this evaluation, too, rating the hand as 11.20.  Looking at the hand a different way, it is a nine loser hand, which argues for avoiding game forcing treatment if you believe the decision is otherwise close.

Now, back to Rob.  With a ten card fit established, he judged to accept the invitation and bid 4.  At IMPs scoring, this decision seems on-target to me.  (Although, I think I would be tempted to pass at mps.)

These judgments by Rob earned our team 10 IMPs, as the opponent at our teammates’ table passed Rob’s hand.  (I am not a believer that there is a gap between a weak two and a one bid; I can understand that some hands would not be opened a weak two because of concerns about the quality of the suit, but I think the strength ranges of the bids are continuous.  However, I know of others who disagree, including the expert who passed at the other table, and then in the post mortem remarked that the hand was too weak for a one bid and too strong for a two bid.)

 

High level competition

Your LHO opens 4, alerted as being weakish because the pair plays Namyats and a stronger bid of 4 was available for a better hand with long hearts.  Partner doubles (for takeout) and this is passed to you.

You hold xxxx   —  KT8xx  KJxx.  What is your call?

Taking mild inference from partner’s failure to overcall 4, I thought it likely that partner held a four card minor.  With second round controls in each minor and first round control of hearts, I took a strong liking to my hand and advanced 5NT!  Partner called 6 with AKQx  Qx  AQxxx  xx.  I think the whole hand was:

 

Dealer:
Vul:
North
   xxxx
   —
   KTxxx
  KJxx
 
West
   QT9x
   Axx
   Jx
  AQxx
East
   J 
   KJT98xxx
   x
  xxx
  South
   AKQx
   Qx
   AQxxx
  xx
 

The spade break was disappointing (but welcomed because there was a sure trump loser if the other table in the sectional Swiss is playing in a spade slam!) but the fortunate club position provides a pitch for the fourth spade, so that 6 is making.

 

Obvious Shift revisited

I am a big fan of Obvious Shift signaling.  See the Granovetters’ terrific volume called “Switch in Time”.  A previous blog entry addressed this approach to defense, too.  See http://jeff.bridgeblogging.com/wp-admin/post.php?post=112&action=edit

Unfortunately, the only one of my regular partners that I have convinced to play Obvious Shift signaling does so, frankly, only as an accommodation to me.  I might have succeeded in convincing others of my partners to follow the general tenet of this signaling approach – that a discouraging attitude signal for the suit led means that signaler would welcome the obvious switch – but, by and large, my partners do not support this approach to signaling.

I remain a fan, however, and this hand from the Swiss demonstrates a reason why.

My RHO opened 1 and I made a takeout double with x  KJx  KJTx  AK8xx.  LHO bid 2, alerted and described as a constructive raise of spades with expected spade length of three cards.  Partner advanced 2 and RHO now jumped to 4.  Although tempted to double, I chose to pass and made an opening lead of the A (our agreed lead from AK and length).

Dummy shows with:

 

Dealer:
Vul:
North
   T98
   Qx
   AQxxxx
  xx
West
   x
   KJx
   KJTx
  AK8xx

What is your defensive plan?

I could think of two routes to four defensive tricks: (a) two clubs and two hearts off the top; or (b) two clubs, a club overruff of dummy (that is, playing for pard to own two clubs and declarer to own four clubs), and an extra trick, either partner’s A or my K sitting after declarer’s ace.  At the table it is hard to think too deeply about the 52 card layout and refine these plans, but they are the two general plans that might be under consideration.

Which plan do you pursue?

The answer to that question is derived from partner’s signaling.  If partner is using Obvious Shift signaling, he will signal discouragement on the A lead if he holds the A or K (but then I can see that I hold the K), and will signal encouragement on the A lead if he does not hold the A or K.  That will tell me if I should switch to a heart or should continue clubs.  But if partner does not use Obvious Shift signaling and might signal encouragement just because he holds the Q, then my hand is unsure which defensive route to pursue: if partner also holds the A, then continuing two more rounds of clubs might produce a fatal ruff/sluff if it is partner who owns four clubs; while if partner instead owns only two clubs and not the ace of hearts, then switching to hearts allows declarer to score dummy’s Q.

Popping or Dropping

Len Aberbach played a grand slam contract on Friday morning in a way that he could take full advantage of some non-optimal discarding by the opponents.

 

North
   AKJ64
   J742
   72
   82
South
   5
   A6
   AT
   AKT97654

 

West North East South
P P 2
2 (controls: one ace and one king)  3 
P 3  4 
P 6 P 7
All pass      

The 7 call strikes me as an overbid, particularly in a club game where even reaching a possibly low-range high card small slam is quite likely to score well.

West opened the K and Len won the ace in hand.  He then proceeded to play all eight rounds of clubs.  West followed suit twice and discarded two hearts (the 8 and 3), two diamonds (the J and 4) and two small spades.  East followed suit once.  East’s first discard was the K, and his remaining six discards were two more hearts (5 and 9) and four small diamonds.

Len reached this four card end position:

 

North
   AKJ
   J
 
 
South
   5
   A6
   T
 

When Len played the A, West discarded a small spade, dummy followed suit with the J, and East discarded T.

“Known” from the discards was that West retained the Q (to which Len’s T was a threat card) and East retained the Q (the only remaining heart of the opponents that can top Len’s 6).  Accordingly, each defender had retained two spades.  Len played spades from the top and found that East had been dealt the QT doubleton.  Making seven for a top board.

The opponents had discarded less than optimally.  East should retain a heart that could be played on the Trick A, so that the distribution of hearts is not fully disclosed.  East might also consider earlier discarding the Q, a “known” card, rather than the J, a “not quite known” card.  And on the A West should play the “known” Q rather than the not known T. 

Let’s say that the opponents had discarded as I suggest.

At the four card end position shown above, West would follow suit on the lead of the A, dummy would follow suit with the J and East, who at this stage would hold QT, should play the Q, the card he is known to hold.

At this point, Len would realize that the six cards retained by the opponents were the Q (or J), T, and four spades to the queen.  Of these six cards, only West’s ownership of the  honor can be inferred.  West’s other two cards might be two spades or could be the T and only one spade.  And East’s remaining three cards might be three spades or could be two spades and the T.  Since only the latter of each of those two possibilities would land the slam (assuming any singleton spade held by West was not the singleton Q), Len would have played for spades to drop and landed the slam.

Essentially, once declarer infers that West has retained a diamond honor (necessary because Len’s T is a threat card), the hand can play as a pop-up squeeze.  If West were dealt the Q, no finesse is necessary because the Q must fall (“pop”) from West on the two top spades in dummy.  Meanwhile, the vigorish in playing for the pop-up squeeze is that the slam is also landed in the event that East were dealt Q or Qx, in which case the Q would “drop” from East.

 

Dealer: N, #13
Vul: Both
North
   AKJ64
   J742
   72
   82
 
West
   98732
   83
   KQJ4
   Q3
East
   QT
   KQT95
   98653
   J
  South
   5
   A6
   AT
   AKT97654
 

 

Counting tricks

Playing in a club Swiss on Friday morning, partner opened 1 in third chair and East overcalled 1NT, ending the auction.

You are unsure which minor suit to lead from Q4, 732, KJ987, 953, but possibly fearing the criticism from partner of “had I bid diamonds, would you have led clubs?”, you decide to lead 3 (count in partner’s suit that you have not supported).

 

West
   A932
   984
   5432
   J7
  South
   Q4
   732
   KJ987
   953

 

7, T, K won by declarer.  Declarer now proceeds to cash the AKQ5.  You discard a club (maybe a less greedy high diamond would have been better) and partner a high spade.  Next declarer exits with a club.  Thankfully, you learn that your club lead caught partner with AQTxx.  He cashes out the club suit and you consider what three pitches to make.

The key is to count declarer’s tricks.  He has won one club and four hearts.  The A in dummy is his sixth trick.  If declarer owns the A, his contract is ironclad.  And if declarer owns the K, he would have cashed two spades rather than risk your side running the diamond suit.  Accordingly, you “place” both the A and the K in partner’s hand.  This projected placement means that declarer owns the J and Q to get to 15 HCP.

As you contemplate the set from partner leading the A and a small diamond allowing you to run all the diamonds you have retained, you consider if anything can go wrong.

Yes, what happens if partner’s projected A is singleton, thus giving declarer Jxx, AKQx, QTx, Kxx for his 1NT overcall?  In that case you must retain the Q and discard two diamonds, along with only one spade.

 

Dealer: S, #15
Vul: NS
North
   KT65
   JT6
   A
   AQT62
 
West
   A932
   984
   5432
   J7
East
   J87
   AKQ5
   QT6
   K84
  South
   Q4
   732
   KJ987
   953
 

 

The defender at the table, although he did find a club lead, greedily kept all of his diamonds while discarding both his spades.  1NT made when his partner forcibly exited with a spade to declarer’s jack.

Undoing the Deed

Playing in a club Swiss on Friday morning, I held J5, A, KQJT72, J974.  At none vul, I heard dealer to my right open 3.  I evaluated the four level as too rich to overcall diamonds with this hand.  LHO’s 4 raise ended the bidding.

Seems normal to lead the A.  I saw this dummy.

 

North
   J5
   A
   KQJT72
   J974
 
East
   K2
   QJ84
   54
   AKQ65

 

A small heart was called from dummy, partner played the 5 (right side up signaling), and declarer played the 6.

What is your defensive plan?

It is hard to envisage a set unless partner holds both the K (as suggested by noting that two lower heart cards are still unseen) and the A and so I “placed” those two cards in his hand.  If declarer holds only one diamond (meaning partner has four diamonds), however, only one diamond trick will cash. 

To cover the maximum chances for a set in case declarer did own only one diamond, I chose to lead the deceptive J (perhaps the Q is a slightly better choice) at Trick 2.  I thus “forced” partner to win the A at Trick 2. 

Having seen me switch to diamonds even though he had encouraged a continuation of hearts, partner should read me for a stiff A.  Accordingly, he will/should readily cash the K at Trick 3.

If partner has from three to five hearts, he will no doubt continue a heart at Trick 4 and my ruff will set the contract.  I would next try to cash a diamond for a two trick set.

But if partner has exactly six hearts*, he will realize that a Trick 4 heart will not set the contract unless there is a trump promotion.  (A trump promotion is possible if: (a) I hold Qx and declarer chooses to ruff with a non ace or to ruff with the ace and not to next run the T; or (b) partner holds Qx and I hold my actual Jx.)  How can I get partner to consider the more likely possibility of a second diamond cashing, given that my deceptive lead of the J at Trick 2 suggests to him that declarer now owns the master diamond(s)?

By discarding the K on the Trick 3 K, that’s how!  Clearly I cannot afford to discard the K unless I also held the Q.  And so Undoing the Deed of my Trick 2 deception will/should clue partner into leading a diamond for me to cash.  (He is unlikely to try for a trump promotion once he sees the K, too, because if I held seven diamonds to the KQJ as well as the stiff A, I might well have overcalled 4.)

I would love to report that declarer had only one diamond and more than two hearts so that the alternative, mundane defense of leading the K at Trick 2 might not work (in case partner let the K hold and encouraged a diamond continuation that declarer would then ruff).  Alas declarer was 7=2=2=2 and any defense should work to set the contract.

 

Dealer: W #8
Vul: None
North
   J5 
   A 
   KQJT72
   J974
 
West
   AQT9743
   76
   93
   T8
East
   K2
   QJ84
   54
   AKQ65
  South
   86
   KT9532
   A86
   32
 

* In retrospect, a six card heart holding by partner could have been inferred by me, once I concluded that the 5 at Trick 1 is an encouraging card.  If partner held the 7, he would have signaled with that card instead of the 5, and partner might reasonably have concluded that the T and 9 looked too important with which to signal.  That’s pretty subtle, though, and so I still prefer my at-the-table switch to J (or Q) at Trick 2, when followed by my K discard on the K at Trick 3.

Look for the better move …

I understand that chess players have an expression, “when you see a good move, look for a better one”.

I would have been well-positioned to have followed that advice in declaring a heart game at today’s club IMP pairs game.

 

West
   97
   A9
   972
  JT9854
East
   AKQ5
   KQ872
   AK
  63

 

West North East South
P 2 P
2* 3 
4 All Pass     

West’s 2 call was artificial, showing “controls”; in this case, two kings or one ace.  I think with East’s hand a 2 call over a 2 response is fine, but that 2NT is a better choice over the actual 2 response.  Whatever, the play is what counts.

North led the A and continued with a club to South’s queen.  South continued with the K and North pitched a spade, allowing dummy to ruff small.

Declarer West has lost two tricks, has a losing spade to address and, if trumps are 4-2, a losing trump, too.  What can be done to eliminate one of these two losers?

Well, perhaps trumps are 3-3; then just drawing trumps will make contract.  That’s Plan 1.

However, normal odds favor trumps being 4-2 and spades no worse than 4-3.  And so you consider ruffing a small spade in hand:  you think of playing the A, then A, K, and then ruffing a third round of spades.  That’s Plan 2.

But what happens if the second round of spades is ruffed?  You recall that North discarded a spade on the third round of clubs.  Surely, looking at AKQx of spades in dummy, North would never discard a spade from a four card holding: North must have been dealt either five or more spades or three or fewer spades.  If North was dealt only two spades, then the K will be ruffed for your third lost trick and you still have a small spade to be dealt with.

You notice that you might be able to draw even four rounds of trumps, by using your good club suit as a surrogate for trumps.  You can play one high heart from dummy and then a heart to your ace.  Should South have been dealt Jx or Tx (or even JT), the second round of trumps will exhaust South of trumps.  Then you can play clubs through North until North decides to ruff in.  At that point you can overruff North ([a]with the 8 if North ruffs in small, or [b] with the Q if North ruffs in with the missing intermediate honor) and draw North’s two remaining trumps ([a] with the KQ if North ruffed in small, or [b] with the K8 if North ruffed in with an intermediate honor).  That’s Plan 3.

But what happens if trumps were 3-3 to begin with and spades were 2-5?  Then, if you adopt Plan 3, South will ruff the fourth round of clubs and North will ruff a spade return by South, each with their sole remaining trump.  Now you go down when Plan 1 would have succeeded.

Then you notice a way to improve on Plan 2.  You still plan to ruff a small spade in hand, but you invert the order of your second spade and first heart plays.  You play the A at Trick 4, to the A at Trick 5, and then lead a spade toward dummy at Trick 6.  If North ruffs in at Trick 6, North is “ruffing air” and you will play East’s losing small spade on this trick.  So, let’s assume that North pitches on Trick 6.  You win a high spade in dummy and play the small spade from dummy, ruffing with your 9.  North can overruff with her heart intermediate honor, but you will be able to draw trumps without risking any further club plays.  Ah, yes, Plan 4 is best.

 

Dealer: North, #13
Vul: Both 
North
   84
   T653
   QJ654
   A2
 
West
   97
   A9
   972
  JT9854
East
   AKQ5
   KQ872
   AK
  63
  South
   JT632
   J4
   T83
   KQ7
 

 

As the cards lie, either Plan 3 or 4 wins, but Plan 4 is superior, the “better move”, and was identified right away by Len Aberbach, my partner.

Alas, I was declarer and not Len.  I carelessly failed to follow the principle to lead toward high cards and undertook Plan 2.  Down 1, when I lost to North both a ruff of the second (high) round of spades and an overruff of the third (low) round of spades that I ruffed with the 9.

 

 

Distributional Disclosure

I was dealer at unfav vul (Monday club game, Board 21) with this hand:  –, AT85, AQJ6, QJ864

Although I am generally reluctant to open 1 with four diamonds and five clubs, opening 1 here seems to be the best choice: I am too strong to pass in hope that I can better describe my hand later, my hearts are too weak to begin a prepared auction by opening 1, and I am reluctant to rebid my poorish club suit over the expected 1 response should I open 1.  Reversing to 2 is, of course, out of the question.  I am not going to enjoy hearing a second round preference to 2 by partner after 1-1-2, but that seems the least of evils for the moment.

Over my 1 opening, partner unexpectedly responded 1NT.  Now RHO overcalled 2.

At my disposal now is a huge amount of distributional information.  By bypassing a response of 1 or 1, I know that partner has no more than six major suit cards.  Hence: (1) we must have at least an eight card fit in one of the minor suits; and (2) the opponents have at least a ten card spade fit.  Accordingly, I bid 3 over the 2♠ overcall.  LHO chose to pass and partner preferenced to 3.  Now my choice to open 1 might come back to haunt me, as partner might be 3=3=3=4 with enough values so that he wanted to give me a chance to make another call.  Still, having bid a lot for owning a 14 count, I felt I had to pass and hope that partner had at least four diamonds.

Now LHO, who had passed 3, chose to bid 3 in the balancing seat.  When 3 was passed to me, I had an opportunity to better describe my hand by bidding 4.  Partner passed and a view of dummy disclosed that he did in fact hold more clubs than diamonds and we had reached our better trump suit.

 

Dealer: N #21
Vul: NS
North
   —
   AT85
   AQJ6
   QJ864
 
West
   AKJ97
   K63
   872
   K7
East
   QT852
   J92
   T53
   92
  South
   643
   Q74
   K94
   AT53
 

 

West North East South
1 P 1NT
2  3  3 
P 3 
P 4 All pass  

A spade was led and a dummy reversal soon produced eleven tricks in the form of three spade ruffs in hand, one heart, four diamonds and three of dummy’s four clubs.

Hand Evaluation: two recent hands

Hand evaluation is one of my favorite bridge topics. 

Here are two recent hands.  The first was shared by a friend of mine and arises from a club game matchpoint event.  The second comes from a club Swiss played yesterday. 

On the first hand your partner opens the bidding in second seat at unfavorable vulnerability with a 3 call.  RHO passes and you hold: AKQ8  QJ3  52  KQT3.  What is your call? 

My friend tells me that 15 of the 17 declarers at the club played 3NT on this hand.  How many of those pairs were faced with the same auction as my friend, I do not know.  But 3NT strikes me as an overbid.  I prefer Pass. 

My thinking it is that is unlikely that we can produce nine tricks without running the diamond suit.  Even with partner being in second seat at unfavorable vulnerability, are his diamonds likely to run opposite two small?  Surely, they might run: perhaps he owns seven diamonds heading by the AK and the suit splits 3-1 or better, or he owns seven diamonds to the AQJ and Kx or Kxx of diamonds in the slot, or maybe he owns seven diamonds to the KQJ and a side entry of the J: there certainly are chances that diamonds run.  But mps is a game of probability and, methinks, there is a much more likely possibility that partner’s diamonds are not ready to run, in particular when his diamonds are not headed by the ace and a defensive gambit so easy as holding off the ace for one round kills the diamond suit.  Partner’s hand could easily be worth one diamond trick in notrump and six diamond tricks in a diamond contract. 

I would pass at mps for sure.  And I even think I would pass at IMPs.  (Yes I know that the odds favor bidding tight vulnerable games at IMPs, but the generally communicated odds are presented under the assumption that the game will either make or fail by a trick; this contract could easily fail by multiple tricks.) 

As it turns out, my friend informs me, the opening bidder held 942  T7  AQT9863  6.  The 3NT declarers who finessed the Q on the first round of that suit found themselves the owner of seven diamond tricks and 3NT often made with overtricks. 

The second hand is IMPs scoring.  A discussion of your partnership’s bidding agreements is essential to your follow ups.  You play 2/1 game forcing with high reverses by opener promising extra values (defined as a king over a minimum opening bid).  

You also play “serious 3NT”, meaning that once an eight card major suit fit is found in a game forcing auction, a bid of 3NT promises extra values and requires partner to control bid, while skipping 3NT to make a control bid denies extra values.  In a hand where each partner has opening bid values, the purpose of serious 3NT is to clarify whether partner has extra values.  The rationale is that: (a) two minimum hands opposite each other will not make slam (absent some spectacular fit that might have been disclosed through a splinter or a “picture bid”); (b) one extra value hand opposite a minimum might make slam, depending upon how the hands mesh; and (c) two extra value hands opposite each other will make slam (unless there is disclosed an uncontrolled suit).  

Lastly, you play “Italian cue bids”, meaning that you control bid aces and kings up the line, but indiscriminately; that is, you would control bid a king in a lower side suit before you would control bid an ace in a higher side suit.  Also, to allow partner to better evaluate his secondary honors in a suit you control bid, your control bids show aces or kings but not singletons or voids. 

OK.  You are dealt A52  8  AK9873  853.  Partner opens 1 and you have an easy response of 2.  Partner next bids 3 (promising extra values as described above) and you bid 3 to show your three card spade support.  (If you held two small in each minor suit, you would have bid 4 as a picture bid.) 

Next partner bids 4.  You haven’t discussed the meaning of skipping serious 3NT in an auction where partner has already shown extras by making his high reverse call of 3.  Logically, though, I think the 4 call describes a minimum for partner’s previous bidding: that is, he has no extra values beyond the extra values already shown. 

You can bid 4.  This promises the A or K of diamonds in your methods.  Since partner had shown extras by bidding 3 at his second turn, your hand is worth the control bid that is “on the house”; that is, that is below game level. 

Partner now control bids 4, showing the A or K of hearts. 

Now what? 

I think 4 is the best call now, much better than keycard or another diamond control bid that would be above game level.  Partner’s heart call has not improved your hand: you have a heart control in the form of a singleton heart.  If partner owns the K, second round controls of hearts are duplicated.  Even if partner owns the A, that card might be less important for slam purposes than, say, the Q or the K, where partner’s high cards match your lengths and not your shortness.  Your 4 call does not deny possession of another control high card, but rather just communicates the message that you have a minimum for your bidding to this point (or, what Mike Lawrence might call the “box” in which lies your hand as described by your earlier calls). 

Partner is not foreclosed from going on, but his hand is also minimum and not particularly good fitting for the auction to date.  He owns this seventeen count: QJT87  AKJ  J  AJT6 and would/should pass 4.  As it turns out, 4 is high enough as no slam makes on the combined hands.  But had partner’s hand been something like this sixteen count: QJT87  Ax  Qx  AKTx , he would have bid on, accurately upgrading because of his diamond help and reaching a good spade slam. 

At the Swiss match yesterday, each table in my match reached a spade slam, missing an opportunity for a big pick up from staying in game.